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Cornell University 2008 
This dissertation broadly examines the economic and health-related consequences of 
individual behaviors, and their interaction with government programs. It is divided 
into three distinct chapters. 
The first chapter examines how changes in family income contribute to 
increasing obesity among low-income families. In the general adult female population, 
the prevalence of obesity decreases substantially as family income increases. 
However, this relationship is not necessarily causal, as numerous other factors could 
be driving this negative correlation. I make use of the expansion of the New York 
State Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) program over the course of the 1990s as a 
source of exogenous variation in family income in order to estimate the causal effect 
of family income on obesity. I show that increasing family income has a positive 
effect on weight and obesity prevalence among the sample population. This effect is 
concentrated among those who are already obese. 
The second chapter simulates the effect on New York State residents of an 
expansion of the EITC on employment, hours worked, income, and poverty, and 
compares these results to a simulation which excludes labor supply effects. Relative to 
estimates excluding labor supply effects, the preferred behavioral results show that an 
expansion of the New York State EITC increases employment by an additional 14,244 
persons, labor earnings by an additional $95.8 million, and family income by an 
additional $84.5 million; decreases poverty by an additional 56,576 persons; and 
increases costs to the State by $29.7 million. 
 The third chapter is a co-authored work with Richard Burkhauser and John 
Cawley. It returns to the topic of obesity, and investigates which measures of fatness 
most accurately predict application for Social Security Disability (DI) benefits. 
Although the social science literature has wholly embraced the use of body mass index 
(BMI) as a measure of fatness, many medical researchers argue that BMI is a poor 
measure of a person’s true fatness. Our results indicate that despite the limitations of 
BMI, it is consistently a significant predictor of future application for DI, although 
more accurate measures of fatness occasionally perform better as predictors of 
application. 
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CHAPTER ONE: 
EXPANDING WALLETS AND WAISTLINES: THE IMPACT OF FAMILY 
INCOME ON THE BMI OF WOMEN AND MEN ELIGIBLE FOR THE 
EARNED INCOME TAX CREDIT 
Abstract 
The rising rate of obesity has reached epidemic proportions and is now one of the most 
serious public health challenges facing the U.S. (U.S. DHHS, 2001). But the 
underlying causes for this increase are unclear. This paper adds to the literature on this 
topic by exploring the importance of family income for obesity using data from the 
National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 cohort. It does so by using exogenous 
variation in family income in a sample of low-income women and men obtained from 
the correlation of their family income with differences in the level of their state’s 
Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) supplement at a point in time and variations in the 
value of federal and state EITC benefits over time. Income significantly raises the 
BMI of EITC–eligible women, and has no appreciable effect on the BMI of EITC-
eligible men. An additional $1,000 increases women’s (men’s) BMI by 0.24 (0.07) 
units or 1.4 (0.5) pounds. These results imply that family income increases from 1990 
to 2002 explain 15 percent of women’s BMI increases and 3 percent of men’s BMI 
increases in the sample. 
 
JEL classifications: I12; I18; I38 
Keywords: Obesity; Body Mass Index; EITC 
1.1. Introduction 
The weight of Americans has increased significantly over the past 30 years with the 
average weight of men and women age 20 to 74 increasing by 9 percent and 12 
percent, respectively (Ogden et al., 2004). Moreover, these trends understate increases 
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in the level of obesity, which has more than doubled in the past 30 years, rising from 
15 percent to over 30 percent for persons age 20 to 74 (Flegal et al., 2002; Hedley et 
al., 2004). 1 Excessive fatness, or obesity, is now recognized as one of the most serious 
public health challenges facing the U.S. (U.S. DHHS, 2001) and other industrialized 
countries (International Obesity Task Force, 2005). Previous research into the 
determinants of obesity and its increasing prevalence has been pointed to, among other 
things, falling food prices, technological innovation in food processing, increasing 
female labor force participation, and reduced smoking (Anderson et al., 2003; Chou et 
al., 2004; Cutler et al., 2003; Lakdawalla and Philipson, 2002). However, this research 
has largely ignored the role of rising income. Further, the work that has examined the 
role of income has produced correlational, rather than causal, estimates of its role in 
the increase in weight and obesity prevalence.  
Previous correlational estimates of the impact of income2 on obesity within the 
Unites States are limited by their failure to account for unobserved factors which could 
be simultaneously affecting an individual’s income and weight or the potential for 
BMI to affect income (See Cawley, 2004). In contrast, this paper estimates the causal 
impact of family income on body mass index (BMI) using an instrumental variables 
(IV) estimation strategy. It does so within a panel data set of women and men, in 
which exogenous variation in their family income is obtained using the correlation of 
their family income with differences in the level of their state Earned Income Tax 
Credit (EITC) supplement at a point in time and variations in the value of federal and 
state EITC benefits over time. 
                                                 
1 Obesity is defined as a body mass index (BMI) value greater than or equal to 30 where BMI is 
calculated as the ratio of weight in kilograms to height in meters squared or weight in pounds to height 
in inches squared multiplied by 703 (NIH, 1998). 
2 Previous studies attempting to explain the rise in weight and obesity have used various measures of 
income including family income (Anderson et al., 2003), household income (Chou et al, 2004; 
Lakdawalla and Philipson, 2002; Quintana-Domeque, 2005), Social Security income (Cawley et al., 
2007), and wage rate (Lakdawalla and Philipson, 2002).  
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The rationale for focusing on the relationship between family income and 
BMI, as opposed to family income and the consumption and expenditure of calories, is 
that the quality of data on caloric intake and expenditure is inaccurate at best, non-
existent at worst. Ideally, data would be available detailing the exact number of 
calories an individual consumes, broken down by the sources of those calories (fat, 
protein, sugars, etc.). This would allow for the estimation of an income-consumption 
path of calories, that is we could investigate how the consumption and expenditure of 
calories varied with family income. Unfortunately, those data do not exist, thus the 
relationship between family income and BMI is estimated, where BMI is used as a 
stock measure of past consumption and expenditure of calories. 
This paper proceeds in the following manner. The second section of this paper 
discusses the consequences and policy implications of rising obesity and provides 
background on the EITC program. The third section reviews the literature on income 
and weight. The fourth section details the data used in the analysis. The fifth section 
outlines the identification strategy and empirical methods, while the sixth section 
provides the empirical results. The paper concludes with a discussion of the results.  
1.2. Background 
1.2.1. Consequences of Obesity 
Understanding the causal association between income and weight would contribute to 
improved estimates of the relative causes of the increasing prevalence of obesity. 
Knowledge of the factors contributing to rising obesity would allow for the 
undertaking of more effective measures to slow down, or ideally reverse, the current 
sharp upward trend in obesity prevalence. The concerns about the increasing 
prevalence of obesity are founded in the association between obesity and adverse 
health outcomes and increased health expenditures. Obesity has been linked to an 
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increased risk of numerous comorbidities, including high blood pressure, high blood 
cholesterol, type II diabetes mellitus, coronary heart disease, osteoarthritis, asthma, 
and gallbladder disease (Must et al., 1999; Mokdad et al., 2003). Moreover, obesity 
has been found to significantly lower life expectancy, particularly among young adults 
(Fontaine et al., 2003). With the rise in obesity, poor diet and physical inactivity have 
now become the number two preventable cause of death in the United States, behind 
only tobacco in the number of lives claimed each year (Mokdad et al., 2004; 2005).  
The numerous obesity-related illnesses invariably lead obese persons to have 
higher medical expenditures than the non-obese. Finkelstein et al. (2003) estimate that, 
on average, annual medical expenditures for obese persons are 37 percent higher than 
for non-obese persons. They also estimate that obesity-related illnesses are responsible 
for 9.1% of U.S. health expenditures, or $92.6 billion (2002 dollars) and that half of 
these expenditures are covered by Medicare and Medicaid. Thus obesity and obesity-
related illnesses also have implications for taxpayers and the federal budget. Aside 
from increasing Medicare and Medicaid expenditures, the high prevalence of obesity 
may have important implications for the solvency of the social security system, as 
obesity has been linked to the decision to take early Social Security retirement benefits 
(Burkhauser and Cawley, 2006). 
1.2.2. Background on the EITC Program 
Originally enacted in 1975 to offset the payroll taxes of workers with low earnings, the 
federal EITC was expanded in scope and size in 1986, 1990 and most recently in 
1993. It is now the Nation’s largest anti-poverty program for non-elderly individuals 
with expenditures of nearly $41.5 billion and over 22 million recipients in tax year 
2005 (Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, 2007). Available only to those with 
labor earnings, the EITC acts as a wage subsidy, providing an incentive for those not 
working to enter the labor force. For those already employed, the effect of the EITC 
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on hours worked is more ambiguous—it is dependent on the relative size of the 
compensated and uncompensated labor supply elasticities. Figure 1.1 displays the 
three distinct earnings ranges over which the EITC operates for tax year 2007. Total 
benefits rise during the phase-in range of the credit (Points A to B), with different 
credit rates and maximum benefit values for single childless individuals, families with 
one eligible child, and families with two or more eligible children. At some labor 
earnings level, called the plateau range, no new benefits are earned as labor earnings 
increase, but the credit is not reduced (Points B to C). At a still higher level of labor 
earnings, the phase-out range begins and total benefits fall with additional earnings 
(Points C to D). This continues until EITC benefits decline to zero: the breakeven 
point. As shown in Table 1.1, in 2007 the federal EITC provided childless individuals 
with a maximum benefit of $428; families with one child a maximum benefit of 
$2,853; and families with two or more children a maximum benefit of $4,716. A 
detailed discussion of the structure of the federal EITC program and its theoretical 
labor supply effects is provided in the Appendix.  
In addition to the federal EITC, as of January 2006 19 states and the District of 
Columbia operate their own supplemental EITC programs. The history and generosity 
of each state’s EITC is presented in Table 1.2. The value of a taxpayer’s state EITC is 
generally set as a fraction of their federal EITC.3 The state credits vary significantly in 
terms of their generosity relative to the federal EITC, and not all are refundable.4  
                                                 
3 Minnesota’s EITC is not linked to the federal EITC program. 
4 As of January 2006, State EITC programs exist in: Colorado; Delaware; D.C.; Illinois; Indiana; Iowa; 
Kansas; Maine; Maryland; Massachusetts; Minnesota; New England; New Jersey; New York; 
Oklahoma; Oregon; Rhode Island; Vermont; Virginia; and Wisconsin. 
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Figure 1.1. Credit Regions of the Federal EITC Program for Tax Year 2007 
 
 
 
Table 1.1. 2007 Earned Income Tax Credit Parameters 
Type of Return 
Maximum 
Eligible 
Earnings 
  
Maximum
Credit 
Begin 
Phase-out 
Breakeven
Point 
Credit 
Rate 
Phase-out
Rate 
Childless $5,590 $428 $7,000 $12,590 7.65% 7.65% 
1 Child $8,390 $2,853 $15,390 $33,241 34.00% 15.98% 
2 or More Children $11,790 $4,716 $15,390 $37,783 40.00% 21.06% 
Note: Married Filing Jointly have Phase-out and Breakeven point $2,000 above listed 
values. 
Source: Urban Institute and Brookings Institute Tax Policy Center 
http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/TaxFacts/TFDB/TFTemplate.cfm?Docid=368 
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Table 1.2. State EITC supplements 1984-2002 (Percent of Federal EITC Credit) 
State: CO DE DC IL IA IN KS ME MD MA MN MN NE NJ NY OK OR RI VA VT WI WI WI 
# of children:         1+   1+   1+      1 2 3+ 
Tax Year:                        
1984                     30 30 30 
1985                     30 30 30 
1986                  22.21      
1987                  23.46      
1988                  22.96  23    
1989                  22.96  25 5 25 75 
1990     5             22.96  28 5 25 75 
1991     6.5      10 10      27.5  28 5 25 75 
1992     6.5      10 10      27.5  28 5 25 75 
1993     6.5      15 15      27.5  28 5 25 75 
1994     6.5      15 15   7.5   27.5  25 4.4 20.8 62.5 
1995     6.5      15 15   10   27.5  25 4 16 50 
1996     6.5      15 15   20   27.5  25 4 14 43 
1997     6.5     10 15 15   20  5 27.5  25 4 14 43 
1998     6.5  10  10 10 15 25   20  5 27  25 4 14 43 
1999 8.5    6.5  10  10 10 25 25   20  5 26.5  25 4 14 43 
2000 10  10 5 6.5  10 5 15 10 25 25  10 22.5  5 26  32 4 14 43 
2001 10  25 5 6.5  10 5 16 15 33 33  15 25  5 25.5  32 4 14 43 
2002 0  25 5 6.5  15 5 16 15 33 33  17.5 27.5 5 5 25  32 4 14 43 
Source: Leigh (2004), P.5 
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1.3. Literature Review 
Cross-nationally, a positive correlation between income and weight exists, with the 
prevalence of obesity being far greater in developed countries than less developed 
countries, and obesity rates increasing as per capita incomes increase (WHO, 2003; 
Seidell and Rissanen, 1998; Swinburn et al., 2004). Within less-developed nations, 
those of higher socioeconomic status are more likely to be obese (Sobal and Stunkard, 
1989). However, for women in the U.S., the opposite is true: the prevalence of obesity 
is lower among those of higher socioeconomic status. For men in the U.S., obesity 
prevalence is relatively constant across family income, while the prevalence of 
overweight increases with household income. Tables 1.3 and 1.4 report clinical weight 
classification by household income for American men and women based on data from 
the 2005 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention Behavioral Risk Factor 
Surveillance System (BRFSS).5 Table 1.3 shows that obesity rates for men are 
approximately 27 percent across household income categories. In Table 1.4, which 
presents clinical weight classification for women, a strong negative correlation 
between household income and obesity is apparent, with the prevalence of obesity for 
those women with household incomes less than $15,000 per year (36 percent) being 
more than twice that of women with household incomes of more than $75,000 per year 
(16 percent). The dichotomy between the cross-national and intra-U.S. correlation of 
income and obesity prevalence suggests that once basic nutritional needs have been 
met—as they are for nearly all persons in the U.S.—a different set of factors drive the 
relation between income and obesity. 
                                                 
5 BRFSS data are used as opposed to National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 Cohort (NLSY79) 
data, as, for a given year, the NLSY79 only captures persons within a 9 year age range. For example, in 
the 2002 wave there are persons between the ages of 37 and 45. However, the cross-tabulation of 
income and clinical weight classification is qualitatively similar using the NLSY79 data. 
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Table 1.3. Weight Classification by Household Income for Men Age 18-64 
 Weight Classification 
Annual Household 
Income 
Neither 
Overweight nor 
Obese 
Overweight Obese Overweight 
and Obese 
Less than $10k 41.19% 32.28% 26.53% 58.81% 
$10k-15k 36.03% 36.31% 27.66% 63.97% 
$15k-20k 36.55% 35.81% 27.65% 63.45% 
$20k-25k 35.38% 37.11% 27.52% 64.62% 
$25k-35k 32.51% 39.97% 27.52% 67.49% 
$35k-50k 30.07% 42.44% 27.50% 69.93% 
$50k-75k 25.25% 46.76% 27.99% 74.75% 
>$75k 26.16% 49.22% 24.62% 73.84% 
Overall 29.20% 44.19% 26.61% 70.80% 
Source: Centers for Disease Control and Prevention Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance 
System 2005 
Table 1.4. Weight Classification by Household Income for Women Age 18-64 
 Weight Classification 
Annual Household 
Income 
Neither 
Overweight nor 
Obese 
Overweight Obese Overweight 
and Obese 
Less than $10k 38.30% 26.09% 35.61% 61.70% 
$10k-15k 38.50% 25.24% 36.27% 61.50% 
$15k-20k 37.33% 27.11% 35.56% 62.67% 
$20k-25k 38.21% 28.89% 32.90% 61.79% 
$25k-35k 40.63% 29.53% 29.84% 59.37% 
$35k-50k 42.75% 30.00% 27.24% 57.25% 
$50k-75k 46.80% 29.11% 24.09% 53.20% 
>$75k 57.96% 26.50% 15.54% 42.04% 
Overall 46.70% 28.12% 25.18% 53.30% 
Source: Centers for Disease Control and Prevention Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance 
System 2005 
The cross-national income-based differences in obesity prevalence have been 
attributed to the fact that higher incomes may lead to (or result from) more sedentary 
lifestyles (Popkin, 2001; Drewnowski, 2000). Similarly, Lakdawalla and Phillipson 
(2002) suggest that labor and non-labor income may differentially affect weight to the 
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extent that the level of physical activity expended in an hour of labor varies from the 
level of physical activity expended during an hour of leisure time. As technological 
innovation decreases the level of physical activity expended on work, income earned 
through the labor market should increase weight more than income earned through the 
asset market. They argue that there is greater variance in the level of technology 
between countries than there is within countries, leading the effect of non-labor 
earnings to dominate the effect of labor earnings within countries, while the opposite 
occurs between countries, leading to the observed dichotomy in cross-national and 
intra-national obesity-income correlations.  
This paper focuses on the within-country relationship between family income 
and weight, generating causal estimates of how family income impacts weight in the 
U.S. Correlational estimates of the relationship between income and weight may not 
accurately capture the causal relationship, as there are numerous unobserved factors 
which could be simultaneously affecting income and weight, such as genetics, 
environment, and health status. In addition, income may be causally affected by 
weight; Cawley (2004) finds evidence that for obese white women, weight lowers 
wages. Failure to account for endogeneity or reverse causality between income and 
weight would render OLS estimates biased and inconsistent. In order to overcome 
these concerns, several studies have taken an IV approach to estimating the causal 
impact of income on weight  
Using the European Community Household Panel (ECHP), Quintana-
Domeque (2005) makes use of the exogenous variation in family income resulting 
from receipt of inheritance, gifts, or lottery winnings of 2000 Euros or more to 
instrument for income. Unfortunately, the instrument is quite weak with an F-statistic 
well below 10 in the first stage. Results show that, the 9 nations included in the 
survey, statistically significant estimates of the impact of income on weight are only 
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found for Denmark and Italy, in the case of women, and Finland in the case of men. In 
all three of these cases the estimated BMI-Income elasticity is found to be negative.  
Cawley et al. (2007) exploit the Social Security “notch”, which unintentionally 
provided double indexation against inflation for certain birth cohorts—leading those in 
the notch to have higher Social Security incomes than those not affected by the 
notch—as an instrument for Social Security income. Though their instrument appears 
to be quite powerful, they are unable to identify any statistically significant 
relationship between additional Social Security income and weight for either men or 
women. However, given the instrument used, the results represent a local average 
treatment effect for a relatively small segment of the population: the low-income 
elderly.  
This study contributes to the existing literature by generating causal estimates 
of the impact of family income on BMI and the probability of being overweight and/or 
obese for women and men eligible for the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC). This 
study significantly expands the population for which causal estimates of the effect of 
family income on BMI have been generated, and, though changes in the federal EITC 
program have previously been used to estimate the impact of income on child 
development (Dahl and Lochner, 2005) it further highlights the validity of this 
instrument and introduces an additional source of exogenous variations in income 
from the state EITC programs.  
1.4. Data 
This paper uses data from the restricted-access National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 
1979 cohort (NLSY79). The NLSY79 is a nationally representative sample of 
individuals who were between the ages of 14 and 21 on December 31, 1978. The first 
wave of the NLSY79 contained information on 12,686 individuals, including an 
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oversample of poor and minority families. NLSY79 interviews were conducted 
annually from 1979 to 1994, and biennially since 1994. This paper makes use of the 
1990 through 2002 waves of the NLSY79 (Tax Years 1989 through 2001), as the 
major changes in the Earned Income Tax Credit program occurred beginning in tax 
year 1991.  
The outcome of interest, BMI, and the clinical weight classifications derived 
from BMI, are constructed using self-reported weight and height data. A respondent’s 
weight is asked in each wave of the NLSY79, while height is asked in only the 1981, 
1982, and 1985 waves of the NLSY79. In order to construct BMI for each wave from 
1990 through 2002 I make use of weight from the relevant wave the NLSY79 and the 
1985 height of respondents. As all respondents are at least 20 years of age in 1985 
their height in 1985 should represent their final adult height and remain constant 
through the end of the sample period examined here. Given that self-reported weight 
and height are known to contain measurement error, the self-reported values from the 
NLSY79 are adjusted by race and gender using the method provided in Cawley and 
Burkhauser (2006). Moreover, as pregnancy distorts a woman’s weight, 351 pregnant 
women are excluded from the sample. 
Table 1.5 presents mean BMI and mean adjusted BMI for the EITC eligible 
sample of women and men employed in the regression in the first and last year of the 
sample period (1990 and 2002), as well as the prevalence of overweight/obese and 
obesity calculated using unadjusted and adjusted BMI. Adjusting weight and height 
for measurement error increases the mean BMI of women in 1990 from 26.48 to 
27.24, and from 29.18 to 29.97 in 2002. For men, the adjustment resulted in 1990 
mean BMI increasing from 26.32 to 27.84 and 2002 mean BMI increasing from 28.18 
to 29.74. Thought the change in mean BMI due to the adjustment in weight and height 
appears minor, it results in the prevalence of obesity for women increasing by nearly 
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22 percent in 1990 from 23.11 percent unadjusted to 28.14 percent when adjusted, and 
by 8.5 percent in 2002, going from 38.33 percent unadjusted to 41.60 percent when 
adjusted. For men the adjustment resulted in even more substantial change, with the 
prevalence of obesity increasing by 61 percent in 1990 from 17.85 percent unadjusted 
to 28.82 percent when adjusted, and by 37 percent in 2002, going from 29.23 percent 
unadjusted to 40.00 percent when adjusted. The correlation between BMI and adjusted 
BMI and obesity prevalence and adjusted obesity prevalence are both quite high, with 
coefficients of 0.99 and 0.90, respectively.  
The data from the NLSY were merged with the characteristics of the federal 
EITC program from the House Ways and Means Committee Green Book 2004, and 
the characteristics of state EITC programs from Leigh (2004). To account for the 
effect of smoking on weight data on the average price of a pack of cigarettes was 
obtained from various years of Orzechowski and Walker’s Tax Burden on Tobacco. 
These prices were adjusted to 2005 dollars using the Bureau of Labor Statistics annual 
Consumer Price Index (CPI). 
Since food prices in general, and the relative price of fast-food to home cooked 
meals, are likely to affect weight, two corresponding food price indices are 
constructed. Data on fast-food meal prices and food for home consumption came from 
the prices in the ACCRA Cost of Living Index published by the Council for 
Community and Economic Research. The state-specific real fast-food meal price index 
included in the model was constructed from the price of a McDonald’s Quarter-
Pounder with Cheese, an 11”-12” thin crust cheese pizza from Pizza Hut or Pizza Inn, 
and a thigh and drumstick from Kentucky Fried Chicken or Church’s. As prices are 
presented on a quarterly basis at the city level, the fast-food prices were averaged 
across cities within a state to form quarterly state prices. The state prices were then 
averaged across the four-quarters in a given year to form annual prices. The real fast-
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food price index was constructed by taking a budget share weighted average of the 
three fast-food prices and dividing by the ACCRA Cost of Living Index.  
The procedure for calculating the real food for home consumption price index 
was identical to that used to calculate the fast-food price index. The real food for home 
consumption index used the prices of 22 food items available in the ACCRA Cost of 
Living Index: a pound of T-Bone Steak; a pound of ground beef; a pound of Jimmy 
Dean or Owens brand pork sausages; a pound of frying chicken; a 6 oz can of Starkist 
or Chicken of the Sea chunk light tuna; half a gallon of whole milk; one dozen Grade 
A large eggs; one pound of Blue Bonnet or Parkay brand margarine; 8 oz canister of 
Kraft brand grated parmesan cheese; 10 lbs white or red potatoes; a pound of bananas; 
a head of iceberg lettuce; a 24 oz loaf of white bread; an 11.5 oz can of Maxwell 
House, Hills Brothers, or Folgers coffee; a 4 pound sack of sugar; an 18 oz box of 
Kellogg’s Corn Flakes or Post’s Toasties; a 15-17 oz can of Del Monte or Green Giant 
brand sweet peas; a 14.5 oz can of Hunt’s or Del Monte tomatoes; a 29 oz can of 
Peaches; a 12 oz can of Minute Maid frozen orange juice; a 16 oz bag of frozen whole 
kernel corn; and a 2 liter bottle of Coca Cola. These 22 items represent the universe of 
grocery food prices available in the ACCRA data set.  
The NLSY sample is divided into those who are eligible for the EITC and 
those who are not by imputing federal EITC eligibility using the National Bureau of 
Economic Research (NBER) TAXSIM program. The TAXSIM program is an online 
tax simulation for calculating liabilities under U.S. Federal and State income tax laws 
from individual data for tax years 1960 through 2013. The TAXSIM program 
determined EITC eligibility for the NLSY79 sample on the basis of: the labor income 
of both the respondent and their spouse; social security income; unemployment 
insurance income; the respondent’s marital status; and the number of children under 
18 in the family. 
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Table 1.5. Unadjusted and Adjusted BMI and Clinical Weight Classification for NLSY79 Sample 
 1990  2002  
Entire Sample Period: 
1990-2002 
 
Unadjusted 
BMI 
Adjusted  
BMI  
Unadjusted 
BMI 
Adjusted  
BMI  
Unadjusted 
BMI 
Adjusted 
BMI 
Mean BMI Women 26.48 27.24  29.18 29.97  27.59 28.34 
         
Percent of Women Overweight/Obese  
(BMI ≥25) 51.13 56.32  67.27 69.87  57.68 62.34 
         
Percent of Women Obese (BMI ≥30) 22.91 27.76  38.31 41.55  30.27 34.54 
         
Mean BMI Men 26.32 27.84  28.18 29.74  27.21 28.73 
         
Percent of Men Overweight/Obese (BMI ≥25) 55.91 67.10  73.65 80.58  63.00 73.93 
         
Percent of Men Obese (BMI ≥30) 17.85 28.82  29.23 40.00  23.81 34.60 
Source: Author’s calculations using 2005 BRFSS 
 16 
Restricting the sample to those eligible for the EITC and those women who are 
not pregnant, combined with missing values for height, weight, income, etc. all waves 
of the NLSY79 from 1990 to 2002 together yield a final value of 7,310 observations 
for women, and 4,372 observations for men. As the NLSY79 is a longitudinal data set, 
multiple observations are available on most persons in the sample. However, as the 
identification method employed here depends on EITC eligibility, and the sample 
persons move in and out of EITC eligibility, the data are used as a repeated cross-
section. 
1.5. Empirical Methods 
1.5.1. Identification Strategy 
Over the course of the 1990s, the federal government significantly expanded the EITC 
program, with the maximum credit available to taxpayers with two or more qualifying 
children increasing in real terms (2005 dollars) from $1,425 in 1990 to $4,410 in 2000. 
From tax year 1985 through tax year 1990 a single phase-in rate of 14.0 percent was 
applied to all taxpayers with qualifying children; however, in tax year 1991 different 
phase-in rates were applied to taxpayers with one qualifying child and taxpayers with 
two or more qualifying children. These respective phase-in rates were subsequently 
increased at different rates. Moreover, in tax year 1994 a small maximum credit of 
$306 ($403 2005 dollars) was extended to taxpayers with no qualifying children and 
different phase-in, plateau, and phase-out regions were established for taxpayers for no 
qualifying children, one qualifying child, and two or more qualifying children.  
With regards to state EITC programs, in 1989, the first year of analysis, only 3 
states (Rhode Island, Vermont, and Wisconsin) had state EITC program in place. By 
2002, the last year of analysis, 15 states and the District of Columbia had EITC 
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programs in place. Moreover, between 1989 and 2002 many states adjusted the 
generosity of their credits relative to the federal credit both upwards and downwards.  
The strategy used to identify the causal effect of family income on BMI 
involves instrumenting for family income using the maximum combined value of 
federal and state EITC benefits a family is eligible for based on their number of 
children. This is a state level value, which only varies for residents by the number of 
children in their family. Taking the example of an EITC eligible person with two 
children in New York State observed in the 2002 wave of the NLSY79, their 
maximum federal EITC benefit for tax year 2001 would be $4,420 ($ 2005) and their 
maximum state EITC benefit would be $1,326 ($ 2005) for a combined current 
maximum benefit of $5,746.  
The maximum value of combined EITC benefits generates exogenous variation 
in family income using differences in the level of a state EITC supplement at a point 
in time and variations in the value of federal and state EITC benefits over time. In 
order for the maximum value of EITC benefits for which a family is eligible to be a 
valid instrument, it must be uncorrelated with the error in the second stage (the 
unobserved determinants of BMI), but correlated with family income. There is no 
reason to suspect that the large non-linear changes in the federal EITC program that 
Congress enacted over the last 20 years—shown in Table 1.6—should be related to 
changes in an individual’s weight. Nor should the level and variation in state EITC 
programs be related to changes in an individual’s weight. Moreover, a large body of 
literature has established a significant relationship between expansions of the EITC 
and changes in labor supply and thus income.6  
                                                 
6 See Hotz and Scholz (2003) for a review of the literature on the effect of the EITC on employment and 
hours worked. 
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Table 1.6. Federal Earned Income Tax Credit  
Maximum Benefit Amount Tax Year 1989-2001 
Tax Year 
Maximum 
Benefit 
(Unadjusted $) 
Maximum 
Benefit 
(2005 $) 
1989   
No children 0 0 
One child 910 1,433 
Two children 910 1,433 
1990   
No children 0 0 
One child 953 1,424 
Two children 953 1,424 
1991   
No children 0 0 
One child 1,192 1,709 
Two children 1,235 1,771 
1992   
No children 0 0 
One child 1,324 1,843 
Two children 1,384 1,927 
1993   
No children 0 0 
One child 1,434 1,938 
Two children 1,511 2,042 
1994   
No children 306 403 
One child 2,038 2,686 
Two children 2,528 3,331 
1995   
No children 314 402 
One child 2,094 2,683 
Two children 3,110 3,985 
1996   
No children 323 402 
One child 2,152 2,679 
Two children 3,556 4,426 
1997   
No children 332 404 
One child 2,210 2,689 
Two children 3,656 4,449 
1998   
No children 341 409 
One child 2,271 2,721 
Two children 3,756 4,500 
1999   
No children 347 407 
One child 2,312 2,710 
Two children 3,816 4,473 
2000   
No children 353 400 
One child 2,353 2,669 
Two children 3,888 4,410 
2001   
No children 364 401 
One child 2,428 2,678 
Two children 4,008 4,420 
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In order to account for possible lags in the time between when either the 
federal or state EITC program is expanded and when people learn of the change and 
respond to the new set of incentives this expansion creates a one year lag of the 
maximum combined value of the federal and state EITC for which a family is eligible 
is included as an additional instrument.  
As a test of the assumption that the instrument used here—the maximum value 
of the combined federal and state EITC benefit—is only relevant to the EITC-eligible 
population, IV models were estimated separately for those men and women in the 
NLSY79 who the TAXSIM program determined are eligible for the EITC, and for 
those determined ineligible for the EITC. An instrument is considered valid if, in the 
first stage of the IV regression, the F-statistic testing the hypothesis that the 
coefficients on the instruments are jointly zero exceeds 10 (Stock et al., 2002). In all 
models estimated on non-EITC eligible men or women the first stage F-statistic is 
below 10. For example, the first stage F-statistic on the maximum value of the 
combined federal and state EITC benefit was 0.42 for all non-EITC eligible women 
with family income less than $40,000 ($ 2005). 
Ideally an instrument for family income would be available for the entire 
population, allowing for estimates of the causal effect of family income on BMI 
generally. Instead, by using the maximum value of EITC benefits for which a family is 
eligible as an instrument the population examined here is restricted to those eligible 
for the EITC program. However, with over 22 million EITC claims filed for tax year 
2005, the EITC eligible population comprises tens of millions of low-income 
persons—a highly policy relevant group. With 132.8 million individual tax returns 
filed for tax year 2005 EITC claimants comprise 16.6 percent of all individual tax 
returns (IRS, 2007). The instrument also has considerable power for this population, 
with first stage F-statistics well above 10. 
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1.5.2. Estimation 
Breaking the negative correlation between income and BMI for women is exceedingly 
easy. Table 1.7 presents OLS estimates of the effect of family income on BMI as 
several covariates are added to the regression. With just family income, or even 
income and age and age squared in the regression the coefficient on income is 
negative. However, with the addition of race the coefficient on income becomes 
positive, and the addition of education further increases the positive coefficient.  
Table 1.7. Progressive Estimates of Adjusted Body Mass Index on Family Income 
for Sample Women 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent Variable: Adjusted BMI OLS OLS OLS OLS 
Family Income ($1,000s) -0.0056 -0.0119 0.007 0.0164 
 (-0.46) (-0.94) (0.56) (1.36) 
Age and Age Squared  X X X 
Race Dummies   X X 
Education Dummies       X 
Observations 7310 7310 7310 7310 
R-Squared 0.00 0.01 0.04 0.05 
Notes: 
(1) Robust t statistics in parentheses. Standard errors clustered by state. 
(2) * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
The full model used here to estimate the effect of family income on BMI takes 
the form: 
iststititist PXIBMI εβββα ++++= 321  (1) 
where i indexes individuals, s indexes states and t indexes time. The dependent 
variable BMIist is the adjusted Body Mass Index of respondent i at time t, Iit is the 
respondent’s total family earnings for the previous calendar year in thousands of 
dollars, Xit is a vector of individual level control variables, Pst is a vector of state level 
control variables and εist is the error term.  
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The vector of individual level controls, Xit, includes the variables: age, age 
squared, hours worked in the previous calendar year, a dummy variable for foreign 
born status, dummy variables for race/ethnicity (Black, Hispanic, White/Other*7), a 
dummy variable for marital status (single*, married, divorced, widowed), the number 
of own children ever born, the number of adults in the household, a set of dichotomous 
variables for the highest level of education achieved (less than high school*, high 
school, some college, a college degree), and residence in an MSA. The NLSY includes 
a respondent’s score on the Armed Forces Qualifying Test (AFQT), which is derived 
from the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB), which was 
administered to NLSY respondents in 1980. The AFQT percentile score is also 
included as a regressor in order to account for the affect of intelligence, independent of 
education, on BMI. A set of controls are included for whether or not a respondent 
participated in AFDC/TANF in the past calendar, or the Food Stamps program, as 
these may, independent of income, impact BMI. Finally, in order to account for the 
possibility that health status may be a joint determinant of BMI and income, a self-
reported measure of whether or not the respondent was prevented from working by a 
health condition is included as a regressor.  
The vector of state level control variables, Pst, includes the average price of a 
pack of cigarettes, the fast-food price index, and the food for home consumption price 
index. State fixed-effects are subsequently added to the model to account for the 
possibility of other unobserved state-level time-invariant determinants of BMI not 
captured by food prices or cigarette prices. The number of hours worked in the 
previous calendar could potentially affect BMI; however, it is also potentially 
endogenous to BMI for the same reasons income is endogenous. Thus, the models are 
                                                 
7 The asterisk denotes the omitted category for the dummy variables. 
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run with number of hours worked excluded and then included in order to asses the 
effect on BMI. 
As discussed above, Lakdawalla and Philipson (2002) argue that labor income 
and non-labor income may have different effects on weight if labor income is obtained 
through sedentary work which results in a decrease in physical activity relative to 
leisure time. Cognizant of the potential for labor and non-labor income to 
differentially affect weight the model was first estimated using labor income and non-
labor income separately—and no statistically significant difference was found between 
the coefficient estimates for labor income and non-labor income for EITC eligible 
women and men. Therefore, family income is used as the measure of income in all 
models presented here. 
In order to account for the aforementioned endogeneity and reverse causality 
problems which could bias correlational estimates of the relationship between income 
and BMI, the method of instrumental variables is employed. The first stage of the IV 
regression takes the form: 
iststitististist PXEITCEITCI υϕφλγδ +++++= −1  (2) 
Where the dependent variable Iit is an individual’s total family income for the previous 
calendar year, the instruments are EITCist , the maximum value of the combined 
federal and state Earned Income Tax Credit for which an individual was eligible for in 
the previous tax year based on their number of children, and EITCist-1 a one year lag of 
the maximum value of the combined federal and state EITC for which an individual 
was eligible, Xit is the vector of demographic characteristics used in Model (1), and Pst 
is the vector of state level characteristics used in Model (1). The maximum value of 
the EITC for the previous calendar year is used as opposed to the current year’s value, 
as income reported in the NLSY is for the previous calendar year. The parameters of 
the federal EITC for tax years 1989 through 2001 are included in Table 1.6.  
 23 
The second stage of the IV model is identical to Model (1) except that wages 
and earnings I is now replaced by its fitted value 
^
I from the first-stage regression 
yielding: 
iststitistist PXIBMI εβββα ++++= 32
^
1  (3) 
The Model is first estimated by Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) for the sample 
of EITC eligible men and women, in order to obtain an uninstumented estimate of the 
relationship between income and BMI, and then IV estimates are obtained. The 
robustness of the coefficient on family income is tested by excluding then including 
the number of hours worked in the previous calendar year in order to account for the 
potential impact of work on weight. Moreover, separate estimations are conducted for 
those who are working and those who are not working. In all cases work does not 
appear to significantly alter the effect of family income on BMI. 
As pointed out by Cawley et al. (2005) and Kan and Tsai (2004), changes in 
income may differentially affect individuals at different points in the BMI distribution, 
and thus least squares-based methods may provide limited information on the effect of 
income on BMI as these methods could potentially mask large affects at either end of 
the BMI distribution. In order to explore the relationship between income and BMI 
over different portions of the BMI distribution two different methods are employed. 
The first is an IV Quantile regression, which takes the form of Model (3) but allows 
the estimation of different marginal effects at various points in the BMI distribution. 
Here estimates are provided at the 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th, and 90th percentiles.  
The second method used to account for potential non-linearity in the 
relationship between income and BMI is to construct indicator variables for two 
clinical weight classifications of interest: overweight (BMI ≥ 25); and obese (BMI 
≥30). Estimates of the relationship between income and the two clinical weight 
classifications are generated using an IV probit model with each of the clinical weight 
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classifications as the dependent variable. For the IV Probit model, the same first and 
second stage regressors as Models (1) and (2) are used, respectively. 
1.6. Empirical Results 
The least squares estimates of the impact of family income on BMI for EITC eligible 
men are presented in Table 1.8. Results of the OLS model are shown in column 1. 
They suggest that an additional $1,000 of family income would have a slight negative 
effect on BMI, decreasing it by 0.008 units. With the introduction of the IVs in 
column 2, the coefficient on family income becomes positive—though the effect is 
statistically insignificant. Columns 3 and 4 then present results from the OLS and IV 
models with the inclusion of the number of hours worked in the previous calendar year 
as a covariate; columns 5 and 6 include state fixed-effects; and columns 7 and 8 
include both hours worked and state fixed-effects. With the inclusion of hours worked 
and the use of IVs in column 4 an additional $1,000 of family income is now 
associated with an increase in BMI of 0.05 units. The inclusion of just state fixed-
effects in column 6 yields an IV estimate indicating that an additional $1,000 of family 
income is associated with an increase in BMI of 0.04 units. With both hours worked 
and state fixed-effects included in the IV model, the coefficient on family income in 
column 8 suggests that an additional $1,000 of family income is associated with an 
increase in BMI of 0.07 units. To put this value in perspective, for the average man in 
the sample whose adjusted height is five feet, nine inches tall, and whose adjusted 
weight is 198 pounds in 2002, a 0.07 unit change in BMI translates into a change in 
weight of 0.5 pounds. 8 For men, the effective of family income on BMI is statistically 
insignificant in all specifications. 
                                                 
8 The average increase in weight in pounds is backed out using the formula BMI= weight (lb) / [height 
(in)]2 x 703 and by plugging in values of in=69 and BMI=0.07. 
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Table 1.8. Estimates of Adjusted Body Mass Index on Family Income for Men 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Dependent Variable: Adjusted BMI OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV IV IV IV IV 
Family Income ($1,000s) -0.0078 0.0304 -0.0022 0.0529 -0.0115 0.0371 -0.0056 0.0693 0.0322 0.1867 0.0529 0.1264 
 (0.64) (0.45) (0.17) (0.53) (1.42) (0.95) (0.62) (1.17) (0.67) (0.76) (1.17) (0.39) 
Number of Hours Worked Past Year   X X   X X     
State FEs     X X X X   X X 
Restrict Sample to Working         X  X  
Restrict Sample to Not Working                   X   X 
Observations 4372 4372 4372 4372 4372 4372 4372 4372 3413 959 3413 959 
R-Squared 0.1 0.09 0.1 0.09 0.1 0.08 0.1 0.07 0.11 0.02 0.08 0.06 
First-Stage F-Statistic  50.95  33.28  98.14  50.80 65.88 4.21 73.17 2.13 
Notes: 
(1) Robust t statistics in parentheses. Standard Errors Clustered by State. 
(2) Other regressors include: age, age squared, foreign born status, race/ethnicity, marital status, number of own children ever born, number 
of adults in the household, highest level of education achieved, residence in an MSA, AFQT Score, TANF receipt, Food Stamps receipts, 
fast food price index, food at home price index, cigarette prices 
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Columns 9 through 12 of Table 1.8 show results for the effect of family 
income on BMI when splitting the sample between those working and those not 
working with and without state fixed-effects. Though family income appears to have a 
larger effect on the BMI of those who are not working than on those who are working, 
the difference in coefficients is not statistically significant. 
Table 1.9 presents the least squares estimates of the effect of family income on 
BMI for women. Across all specifications family income has a much larger positive 
effect on the BMI of women than it did on the BMI of men. In the OLS model, shown 
in column 1, an additional $1,000 of family income is associated with an increase of 
0.03 BMI units. With the introduction of the IVs in column 2, the magnitude of the 
coefficient on family income increases—indicating that an additional $1,000 of family 
income is associated with an increase of 0.18 BMI units. As in Table 1.8, columns 3 
and 4 of Table 1.9 present results from the OLS and IV models with the inclusion of 
the number of hours worked in the previous calendar year as a covariate; columns 5 
and 6 include state fixed-effects; and columns 7 and 8 include both hours worked and 
stat fixed-effects. In all specifications the coefficient on family income increases in 
magnitude with the inclusion of IVs. With the inclusion of hours worked and the use 
of IVs in column 4 an additional $1,000 of family income is now associated with an 
increase in BMI of 0.24 units. The inclusion of state fixed-effects in column 6 yields 
an IV estimate indicating that an additional $1,000 of family income is associated with 
an increase in BMI of 0.18 units. With both hours worked and state fixed-effects 
included in the IV model, the coefficient on family income in column 8 suggests that 
an additional $1,000 of family income is associated with an increase in BMI of 0.24 
units, or 1.39 pounds (the average woman in the sample has an adjusted height of five 
feet, four inches, and an adjusted weight of 174 pounds in 2002 meaning that 0.24 
BMI units results in a change in weight of 1.39 pounds). 
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Table 1.9. Estimates of Adjusted Body Mass Index on Family Income for Women 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Dependent Variable: 
Adjusted BMI 
OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV IV IV IV IV 
Family Income ($1,000s) 0.0348*** 0.1834* 0.0272* 0.2354 0.0320*** 0.1758*** 0.0256** 0.2377** 0.2077*** 0.4506 0.1609** 0.7866 
 (2.77) (1.79) (1.99) (1.53) (3.37) (2.66) (2.47) (2.23) (2.70) (1.23) (1.96) (1.57) 
Number of Hours Worked 
Past Year   X X   X X     
State FEs     X X X X   X X 
Restrict Sample to Working         X  X  
Restrict Sample to Not 
Working                   X   X 
Observations 7310 7310 7310 7310 7310 7310 7310 7310 5345 2165 5345 2165 
R-Squared 0.08 0.05 0.08 0.03 0.08 0.04 0.08 0.02 0.05 0.00 0.06 0.00 
First-Stage F-Statistic  46.19  30.37  80.48  37.07 57.51 4.64 48.42 3.11 
Notes: 
(1) Robust t statistics in parentheses. Standard Errors Clustered by State. 
(2) Other regressors include: age, age squared, foreign born status, race/ethnicity, marital status, number of own children ever born, number 
of adults in the household, highest level of education achieved, residence in an MSA, AFQT Score, TANF receipt, Food Stamps receipts, 
fast food price index, food at home price index, cigarette prices 
(3) * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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For women, the IV coefficient estimates on family income are statistically 
significant in all specifications except #4, which includes only hours worked—owing 
to the reduction in the first stage F-statistic as a result of the correlation of hours 
worked with income. The use of IVs yields a significant improvement in the 
coefficient estimate on family income across specifications for both men and women, 
as the results of Hausmann tests (not reported here) reject equality between OLS and 
IV estimates. 
To allow for the possibility that the effect of income on BMI varies across the 
BMI distribution, IV Quantile models were estimated at the 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th, and 
90th percentiles. Table 1.10 presents the results of the IV Quantile regressions for 
men—with and without the inclusion of the number of hours worked—which indicate 
that the aggregate estimates presented in Table 1.8 do in fact mask important variation 
in the effect of family income across the BMI distribution. Row 1 presents results 
without the inclusion of hours worked. Here, an additional $1,000 of family income is 
associated with: an increase of 0.094 BMI units at the 10th percentile of BMI (22.67 
units); an increase of 0.064 BMI units at the 25th percentile of BMI (24.90 units); an 
increase of 0.085 BMI units at the 50th percentile of BMI (27.79 units); a decrease of 
0.001 units at the 75th percentile of BMI (31.70 units); and a decrease of 0.087 units at 
the 90th percentile of BMI (35.80 units). 
With the inclusion of hours worked in row 2, an additional $1,000 of family 
income is associated with an increase of 0.137 BMI units at the 10th percentile of BMI; 
an increase of 0.093 BMI units at the 25th percentile of BMI; an increase of 0.12 BMI 
units at the 50th percentile of BMI; a decrease of 0.016 units at the 75th percentile of 
BMI; and a decrease of 0.144 units at the 90th percentile of BMI. Translating these 
coefficient estimates into pounds, the results indicate that the effect of an additional 
$1,000 in family income on the weight of men varies from increasing weight by one 
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pound at the bottom end of the BMI distribution to decreasing weight by one pound at 
the top end. However, regardless of whether or not hours worked is included, only the 
coefficient estimates on family income at the 10th percentile of BMI are statistically 
significant (and positive).  
Table 1.11 presents the IV Quantile estimates for women. Unlike the estimates 
for men, those for women demonstrate a clear upward trend in the association between 
family income and BMI across the BMI distribution. Row 1 presents results without 
the inclusion of hours worked, which show that at the 10th percentile of women’s BMI 
(20.45 units), an additional $1,000 of family income is associated with an increase of 
0.052 BMI units, while at the 90th percentile of BMI (37.71 units) an additional $1,000 
of family income is associated with an increase of 0.278 BMI units. The magnitude of 
the coefficient on income increases significantly between the 25th percentile of BMI 
(23.06 units) and the 50th percentiles of BMI (27.00 units), and the 75th percentile of 
BMI (32.44 units) and the 90th percentile of BMI. From the 25th to 50th percentile, the 
effect of an additional $1,000 in family income on BMI nearly doubles, going from 
increasing BMI by 0.098 units to increasing BMI by 0.182 units. Between the 75th 
percentile of BMI and the 90th percentile of BMI, the effect of an additional $1,000 in 
family income on BMI increases by more than 0.10 BMI units, going from increasing 
BMI by 0.1637 units to increasing BMI by 0.278 units.  
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Table 1.10. Adjusted Body Mass Index IV Quantile Estimates for Men 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent Variable: Adjusted BMI 
10th  
Percentile 25th Percentile 50th Percentile 75th Percentile 90th Percentile 
Family Income ($1,000s) 0.0935* 0.0637 0.0848 -0.0007 -0.0873 
 (1.82) (1.31) (1.52) (0.01) (1.25) 
      
Family Income ($1,000s): with Hours Worked 0.1372* 0.0929 0.1204 -0.0161 -0.1443 
 (1.73) (1.25) (1.52) (0.14) (1.40) 
Observations 4372  4372  4372  4372  4372  
Notes: 
(1) t statistics in parentheses derived from Bootstrapped standard errors 
(2) Other regressors include: age, age squared, foreign born status, race/ethnicity, marital status, number of own children ever born, 
number of adults in the household, highest level of education achieved, residence in an MSA, AFQT Score, TANF receipt, Food Stamps 
receipts, fast food price index, food at home price index, cigarette prices 
(3) * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
 
 
  
31
 
 
Table 1.11. Adjusted Body Mass Index IV Quantile Estimates for Women 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent Variable: Adjusted BMI 10th Percentile 
25th 
Percentile 
50th 
Percentile 
75th 
Percentile 
90th 
Percentile 
Family Income ($1,000s) 0.0523 0.0981 0.1824** 0.1636 0.2776* 
 (0.96) (1.43) (2.57) (1.47) (1.72) 
      
Family Income ($1,000s): with Hours Worked 0.0411 0.0659 0.2164* 0.2063 0.4281* 
 (0.42) (0.65) (1.79) (1.11) (1.67) 
Observations 7310 7310 7310 7310 7310 
Notes: 
(1) t statistics in parentheses derived from Bootstrapped standard errors 
(2) Other regressors include: age, age squared, foreign born status, race/ethnicity, marital status, number of own children ever born, number 
of adults in the household, highest level of education achieved, residence in an MSA, AFQT Score, TANF receipt, Food Stamps receipts, 
fast food price index, food at home price index, cigarette prices 
(3) * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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With the inclusion of hours worked to the model in row 2 of Table 1.11 the 
magnitude of the coefficient decreases for those at the 10th and 25th percentile of BMI 
and increases for those at or above the 50th percentile. Here, an additional $1,000 of 
family income is associated with an increase of 0.041 BMI units at the 10th percentile 
of BMI; an increase of 0.066 BMI at the 25th percentile of BMI; an increase of 0.216 
BMI units at the 50th percentile; an increase of 0.206 BMI units at the 75th percentile; 
and an increase of 0.428 units at the 90th percentile of BMI. These results indicate that 
for women the effect of income on BMI is largest for those who are already 
overweight or obese. The coefficient estimates for women in the IV model are 
statistically significant at the 50th and 90th percentiles of BMI.  
As an additional means of examining the possibility that the impact of family 
income varies over the range of BMI, Probit and IV Probit models of the effect of 
family income on the binary dependent variables overweight and obese are estimated, 
with the results presented in Tables 1.12 and 1.13.9 Probit models are used as opposed 
to linear probability models, as they are the preferred method of estimating models 
with binary dependent variables (Maddale, 1983).  
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 1.12 present standard probit and IV Probit results, 
respectively, for the effect of income on the probability of being overweight for men, 
while columns 3 and 4 add the number of hours worked to the model. The standard 
Probit model indicates that an additional $1,000 in family income is associated with a 
0.06 percent decrease in the probability of being overweight, while the IV estimate 
indicates that an additional $1,000 in family income increases the probability of being 
overweight by 0.24 percent. The addition of hours worked to the model yields similar 
results, with the standard Probit model indicating that an additional $1,000 in family 
income is associated with a 0.05 percent decrease in the probability of being 
                                                 
9 The overweight classification includes those in the obese category as it covers all individuals with a 
BMI ≥ 25. 
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overweight, while the IV estimate indicate that an additional $1,000 in family income 
increases the probability of being overweight by 0.44 percent.  
Columns 5 through 8 of Table 1.12 then present the corresponding results for 
the dependent variable obese. Again, the standard Probit model finds a negative 
relationship between family income and the probability of being obese, while the IV 
estimate indicates a positive relationship between family income and the probability of 
being obese. As with most of the previous estimates for men, none of the IV effects of 
family income on clinical weight classification are statistically significant.  
Table 1.13 presents the Probit estimates for women. Similar to the OLS 
estimates of the effect of family income on BMI, the IV results show significant 
increases in the magnitude of the effect of family income on both the probability of 
being overweight and the probability of being obese, relative to the standard estimates. 
Column 1 presents the standard Probit estimate, which indicates that an additional 
$1,000 in family income increases the probability of being overweight by 0.23 
percent. With the use of the IV Probit in column 2 the coefficient on family income 
increases in magnitude and now indicates that an additional $1,000 in family income 
increases the probability of being overweight by 0.71 percent. With the inclusion of 
hours worked the IV Probit model yields an even larger effect, with an additional 
$1,000 in family income increasing the probability of being overweight by 0.84 
percent.  
Results for obesity are presented in columns 5 through 8 of Table 1.13. As 
with overweight, the standard Probit model yields significantly lower estimates of the 
effect of family income on the probability of being obese. In columns 5 and 6, the 
effect of an additional $1,000 in family income goes from increasing the probability of 
being obese by 0.16 percent in the standard Probit model to increasing the probability 
of being obese by 1.27 percent in the IV Probit model, while in columns 7 and 8, 
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which include hours worked, the effect of an additional $1,000 in family income goes 
from increasing the probability of being obese by 0.11 percent to increasing the 
probability of being obese by 1.67 percent. The IV coefficient estimates on family 
income are significant at the 5 percent level with or without the inclusion of hours 
worked. 
1.7. Conclusions 
The results presented in this paper indicate that correlational estimates of the impact of 
income on weight are strongly biased downward. For both men and women, and 
across all models and specifications, the standard estimates suggested a much smaller 
effect of family income on weight than the estimates produced using IVs. In response 
to the theoretical predictions presented in Lakdawalla and Philipson (2002) regarding 
differential effects for labor and non-labor income on weight, this paper estimated 
models with family income as a whole, as well as split between labor and non-labor 
income. Moreover, the number of hours of worked was included and then excluded in 
an attempt to capture the effect of work on weight. This produced no significant 
change in the estimates. Lastly, separate estimates for those working and not working 
were produced; again yielding no significant difference in the coefficient on family 
income. This paper provides robust evidence of a positive causal link between income 
and weight for women; however, no statistically significant relationship between 
income and weight is found for men. 
Using the exogenous variation in family income obtained from the correlation 
of their family income with differences in the level of the state EITC supplement at a 
point in time and variations in the value of federal and state EITC benefits over time, I 
find that additional family income significantly raises the BMI of women eligible for 
the EITC, while for men a small positive, though insignificant, relationship is found. 
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For women an additional $1,000 is associated with an increase in BMI of as much as 
0.24 units, or an average of 1.4 pounds of weight, while for men, an additional $1,000 
of family income is associated with an increase in BMI of as much as 0.07 units or an 
average of 0.5 pounds of weight in the IV specification which includes hours worked 
and state fixed-effects.  
As the average real family income in my sample increased from $17,387 in 
1989 to $18,032 in 2001 for men, and from $16,860 in 1989 to $18,533 in 2002 for 
women, these IV coefficient estimates imply that rising family incomes resulted in an 
average increase in BMI of 0.05 units (0.33 pounds) for men and 0.40 units (2.33 
pounds) for women. As shown in Table 1.5 average adjusted BMI increased by 1.90 
units for men and 2.73 units for women from 1990 to 2002. Therefore my results 
indicate that increased income is responsible for 3 percent of the increase in BMI for 
the men in my sample and 15 percent of the increase in BMI for the women in my 
sample.  
This paper’s estimation of the effect of family income on BMI at different 
points in the BMI distribution using an IV Quantile model yields results that suggest 
that, at least for women, the effect of income on weight is greatest for those who are 
already either overweight or obese. Moreover, the results for women from the probit 
model suggest that increasing family income significantly increases the prevalence of 
overweight and obese. The increased prevalence of overweight and obese is 
particularly troubling from a public health perspective, as Calle et al. (1999) shows 
that for women age 30 to 64 going from a healthy weight (BMI between 20.5 and 
24.9) to overweight (BMI between 25 and 29.9) increases mortality by approximately 
33 percent, and that going from overweight to marginally obese (BMI between 30.0 
and 31.9) increases mortality by 14 percent.  
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Table 1.12. Probit Estimates of Overweight and Obese for Men 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Dependent Variable:  Overweight Obese 
  Probit IV Probit IV Probit IV Probit IV 
Family Income ($1,000s) 0.0062*** 0.0189 -0.0019 0.0077 -0.0034 0.0127 -0.0031 0.0202 
 (2.65) (0.98) (0.58) (0.40) (1.04) (0.82) (1.08) (0.98) 
 [-0.0006] [0.0024] [-0.0005] [0.0044] [-0.0012] [0.0047] [-0.0011] [0.074] 
Number of Hours Worked Past Year     X X     X X 
Observations 4372 4372 4372 4372 4372 4372 4372 4372 
First-Stage F-Statistic  50.95  33.28  50.95  33.28 
Notes: 
(1) Robust t statistics in parentheses. Standard Errors Clustered by State. 
(2) Marginal effects in brackets. 
(3) Other regressors include: age, age squared, foreign born status, race/ethnicity, marital status, number of own children ever born, number 
of adults in the household, highest level of education achieved, residence in an MSA, AFQT Score, TANF receipt, Food Stamps receipts, 
fast food price index, food at home price index, cigarette prices 
(4) * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 1.13. Probit Estimates of Overweight and Obese for Women 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Dependent Variable:  Overweight Obese 
  Probit IV Probit IV Probit IV Probit IV 
Family Income ($1,000s) 0.0062*** 0.0189 0.0046* 0.0222 0.0043** 0.0346** 0.003 0.0451** 
 (2.65) (0.98) (1.88) (0.86) (2.18) (2.51) (1.22) (1.99) 
 [0.0023] [0.0071] [0.0017] [0.0084] [0.0016] [0.0127] [0.0011] [0.0167] 
Number of Hours Worked Past Year     X X     X X 
Observations 7310 7310 7310 7310 7310 7310 7310 7310 
First-Stage F-Statistic  46.19  30.37  46.19  30.37 
Notes: 
(1) Robust t statistics in parentheses. Standard Errors Clustered by State. 
(2) Marginal effects in brackets. 
(3) Other regressors include: age, age squared, foreign born status, race/ethnicity, marital status, number of own children ever born, number 
of adults in the household, highest level of education achieved, residence in an MSA, AFQT Score, TANF receipt, Food Stamps receipts, 
fast food price index, food at home price index, cigarette prices 
(4) * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Based on the IV Quantile regression results, the majority of the effect of family 
income on BMI appears to be driven by those women who are already classified as 
overweight or obese. These results suggest that additional income mainly serves to 
increase the weight of those already overweight and obese. Thus, the need exists for 
continued research into what income fueled activity is driving increases in weight: 
increased food consumption and poor nutritional choices or increased sedentary 
activities.  
Unfortunately, my choice of IV limits the broad generalizability of the results 
presented here. However, given that the instrument used, eligibility for the Earned 
Income Tax Credit, applies to 22 million low-income families, or 16.6 percent of all 
individual income tax returns, the results are applicable to a large swath of the 
American population, and certainly to those with the greatest prevalence of 
overweight and obese. 
This paper opens numerous avenues of future research. Most immediately, the 
methods used here could be extended to estimating the effect of family income on the 
BMI of children using the Children of the NLSY79 dataset. Secondly, the strength of 
the EITC as an instrument for income opens up the possibility of exploring causal 
relationships between income and numerous outcomes previously plagued by 
endogeneity and reverse causality. Lastly, given that no papers examining the 
determinants of the rise of obesity in the U.S. have accounted for the endogeneity and 
reverse causality between income and BMI, future research in this area could make 
use of the EITC as an instrument and improve the estimates of the causes of the 
obesity epidemic. 
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APPENDIX 
1.8. Labor Supply Effects of the Earned Income Tax Credit Program 
1.8.1. Design of the program 
Table 1.1 details the EITC parameters for Tax Year 2007. For a single childless 
individual, a credit rate of 7.65 percent is applied to the first $5,590 in labor earnings 
for a maximum benefit of $428. For family with one child, a credit rate of 34 percent 
is applied to earnings up to $8,390, for a maximum benefit of $2,853, while for a 
family with two or more children a credit rate of 40 percent is applied to earnings up 
to $11,790, for a maximum benefit of $4,716. Beginning at earnings of $7,000 for 
single childless individual and $15,390 for both families with one eligible child and 
families with two or more eligible children the maximum benefits are reduced at a rate 
of 7.65 percent, 15.98 percent, and 21.06 percent, respectively. Federal EITC benefits 
are completely phased out at $12,590 for single childless individuals, $33,241 for 
families with one eligible child, and $37,783 for families with two or more children 
eligible children. For those married filling jointly, the breakeven point is extended by 
$2000 in an attempt to partially offset the disincentive to marriage. 
1.8.2. Theoretical Effects on Labor Supply 
Labor supply models based on microeconomic theory assume that workers have a 
fixed amount of time which they divide between work and leisure in order to 
maximize their utility. Workers derive utility from the goods that can be purchased 
with their labor earnings and directly from their leisure time. Potential workers have a 
reservation wage (level of compensation) below which they will not work at all as the 
utility derived from the potential labor earnings does not exceed the utility derived 
from allocating those hours to leisure. However, once the offered wage exceeds their 
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reservation wage they will work, but the number of hours they will work depends on 
the wage rate offered. Hence, the theoretical effect of the EITC on the decision to 
work for unmarried individuals is unambiguously positive. Because the EITC 
unambiguously raises the offer wage it can only increase the likelihood that an eligible 
person will enter the labor market and agree to work. However, the availability of the 
EITC to married people results in less obvious overall employment outcomes. While 
the worker taking advantage of the EITC may enter the workforce, the increased 
income this brings to the family could reduce the employment of other family 
members since, if leisure is a normal good (more of it is demanded as income 
increases), this increased income could lead to another earner in the family reducing 
overall hours worked and possibly leaving the labor force (Ellwood, 2001). 
The effect of the EITC on hours worked for those already in the labor force is 
more ambiguous. Microeconomic theory argues that if the EITC changes the value of 
an additional hour of work, it will also change the income associated with that 
additional hour of work. The change in the value of an additional hour of work is 
referred to as the “substitution” effect and it implies that if workers receive a higher 
return from an additional hour of work they will choose to work more and reduce their 
leisure time, all else equal. However, a change in the income associated with that 
additional hour of work is referred to as the “income effect” and, assuming that leisure 
is a normal good, an increase in compensation will result in workers working less and 
taking more leisure. 
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CHAPTER TWO: 
EXPANDING NEW YORK STATE’S EARNED INCOME TAX CREDIT 
PROGRAM: THE EFFECT ON WORK, INCOME, AND POVERTY 
Abstract 
Given its favorable employment incentives and ability to target the working poor, the 
Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) has become the primary anti-poverty program at 
both the federal and state level. However, when evaluating the effect of EITC 
programs on income and poverty, governments generally calculate the effect using 
simple accounting, where the value of the state and/or federal EITC benefit is added to 
a person’s observed income. These calculations omit the behavioral incentives created 
by the existence of these programs, the corresponding effect on labor supply and hours 
worked, and therefore the actual effect on income and poverty. Using data from the 
2005 Current Population Annual Social and Economic Supplement and labor supply 
parameters drawn from the labor economics and EITC literature, this paper simulates 
the effect of an expansion of the New York State EITC benefit on employment, hours 
worked, income, poverty, and program expenditures for those both currently in the 
labor force, and those not currently in the labor force. These results are then compared 
to those omitting labor supply effects. Relative to estimates excluding labor supply 
effects, the preferred behavioral results show that an expansion of the New York State 
EITC increases employment by an additional 14,244 persons, labor earnings by an 
additional $95.8 million, family income by an additional $84.5 million, decreases 
poverty by an additional 56,576 persons, and increases costs to the State by $29.7 
million. 
 
JEL classifications: H24; J2; J38 
Keywords: Poverty; EITC; Labor Supply 
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2.1. Introduction 
The federal Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) is the nation’s largest anti-poverty 
program for non-elderly individuals and is responsible for lifting millions of working 
families out of poverty (Meyer and Holtz-Eakin, 2001). For tax year 2004 the federal 
EITC program disbursed $39.2 billion1 to over 21 million low-income workers 
(Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, 2007). In addition to the federal EITC, as of 
January 2006, 19 states and the District of Columbia operate their own supplemental 
EITC programs. The value of a taxpayer’s state EITC is generally set as a fraction of 
their federal EITC.2 The state credits vary significantly in terms of their generosity 
relative to the federal EITC, and not all are refundable.3  
New York State was an early implementer of a state EITC program and offers 
one of the largest fully refundable supplemental credits in the nation. Initially set at 
7.5 percent of the federal credit in 1994, the New York State supplement to the 
Federal EITC has been raised six times since then, reaching 30 percent of the federal 
EITC in 2003. In Tax Year 2004, 1.3 million New York State families received almost 
$670 million in state EITC credits, making it the largest state EITC in the Nation in 
terms of the total value of tax credits provided (New York State Department of 
Taxation and Finance, 2005).  
When evaluating the effect of both state and federal EITC programs on income 
and poverty, policy makers generally calculate the effect using simple accounting, 
whereby the value of the state and/or federal EITC benefit is simply added to a 
persons observed income. For example, this procedure is used by the Census Bureau 
in the calculation of its Alternative Poverty Rates, and also by the Congressional 
                                                 
1 Unless otherwise noted, all figures are in 2004 dollars. 
2 Minnesota’s EITC is not linked to the Federal EITC program. 
3 As of January 2006, State EITC programs exist in: Colorado; Delaware; D.C.; Illinois; Indiana; Iowa; 
Kansas; Maine; Maryland; Massachusetts; Minnesota; New England; New Jersey; New York; 
Oklahoma; Oregon; Rhode Island; Vermont; Virginia; and Wisconsin. 
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Research Service for the House Ways and Means Committee Green Book. However, 
by simply adding the value of the EITC benefits to income, these calculations omit the 
behavioral incentives created by the existence of these programs, the corresponding 
effect on labor supply and hours worked, and therefore income and poverty. As such, 
these types of estimates do not accurately capture the full effect of EITC programs on 
work, income, and poverty rates. 
While numerous studies have evaluated the labor supply effects of the federal 
EITC4 only a handful (Holtzblatt et al., 1994; Browning, 1995; Scholz, 1996) have 
simulated the net of labor supply behavior effect on employment and hours worked of 
a potential future increase in the federal EITC. No previous study has simulated the 
effect of an increase in a state supplement on employment or hours worked, nor have 
they extended their simulation to estimating the effect on poverty rates. This study 
simulates the effect—including labor supply behavior—of an expansion of the New 
York State EITC supplement on employment, hours worked, income, and poverty 
using data from the 2005 Current Population Survey (CPS) Annual Social and 
Economic Supplement (ASEC), which covers tax year 2004. The simulation starts 
from the current 30 percent New York State Supplement to the Federal EITC and 
increases the value of the supplement in increments of 5 percentage points to 35 
percent, 40 percent, and 45 percent of the Federal EITC benefit. This study contributes 
to the existing literature by extending the simulation of EITC expansion outcomes to 
income and poverty rates—two outcomes of immense interest to policymakers—and 
by providing a framework for states to simulate the introduction or expansion of a 
supplemental EITC program.  
                                                 
4 See Hotz and Scholz (2003) for a review of papers examining the labor supply effects of the EITC. 
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2.2. Background 
2.2.1. Background on the Federal EITC 
Originally enacted in 1975 to offset the payroll taxes of workers with low earnings, the 
Federal EITC was expanded in scope and size in 1986, 1990 and most recently in 
1993. Available only to those with labor earnings, the EITC acts as a wage subsidy, 
providing an incentive for those not working to enter the labor force. It also 
supplements the income of those who, despite their work effort, have low labor 
earnings.  
There are three distinct earnings ranges to this labor earnings-based tax credit 
(see Figure 2.1). Total benefits rise during the phase-in range of the credit, reaching 
the maximum benefit level for families with eligible children near the poverty 
threshold for a family of three. At some labor earnings level, called the plateau range, 
no new benefits are earned as labor earnings increase, but the credit is not reduced. At 
a still higher level of labor earnings, the phase-out range begins and total benefits fall 
with additional earnings. This continues until EITC benefits decline to zero; the 
breakeven point is reached. The EITC was designed with these three distinct regions 
in order to largely avoid the work disincentives present in other means tested programs 
in which benefits are reduced for every dollar earned.  
Table 2.1 presents the Federal EITC parameters for tax year 2004. For a family 
with one child, a credit rate of 34 percent is applied to earnings up to $7,660, for a 
maximum credit of $2,604, while for a family with two or more children a credit rate 
of 40 percent is applied to labor earnings up to $10,750, for a maximum credit of 
$4,300. Single individuals receive a credit of 7.65 percent on earnings up to $5,100 for 
a maximum credit of $390. The phase-out of the credit begins at earnings of $6,390 
for a single individual and $14,040 for families with children. With benefits reduced at 
a rate of 7.65 percent, 15.98 percent, and 21.06 percent, respectively, the Federal 
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EITC breakeven points are $11,750 for single individuals; $31,030 for families with 
one eligible child; and $35,263 for families with two or more eligible children. For 
those married filing jointly, the plateau and breakeven point is extended by $2,000 in 
an attempt to partially offset the disincentive to marriage. The long range over which 
the EITC benefit plateaus and is phased-out means that besides helping families to 
escape poverty, the EITC helps to boost the income of a large number of working 
families that earn above the poverty level but still have low incomes.  
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Figure 2.1. Federal EITC Schedule 2004.  Source: Internal Revenue Service 
(Downloaded March 2005 from http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-drop/rp-03-85.pdf) 
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Table 2.1. 2004 Federal Earned Income Tax Credit Parameters  
 Type of Return 
Maximum
Eligible 
Earnings 
Maximum
Credit 
Begin 
Phase-out 
Breakeven
Point 
Credit 
Rate 
Phase-out
Rate 
Childless $5,100  $390  $6,390  $11,490  7.65% 7.65% 
1 Child $7,660  $2,604  $14,040  $30,338  34.00% 15.98% 
2 or More Children $10,750  $4,300  $14,040  $34,458  40.00% 21.06% 
Note: Married Filing Jointly have Phase-out and Breakeven points $1,000 above listed 
values. 
Source: Downloaded March 2005 from http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-drop/rp-03-85.pdf 
Results of a wide range of studies evaluating past expansions using a variety of 
econometric techniques show that the Earned Income Tax Credit is effective at 
increasing employment rates of low-wage workers (Leibman, 1998; Eissa and 
Leibman, 1996; Meyer and Rosenbaum, 1999; Holtz, Mullin and Scholz, 2006), and 
that previous expansions of the EITC have reduced the poverty rates of children and 
families (Blank and Schoeni, 2000). The effect of the EITC on poverty has also been 
demonstrated by simply adding the credit to family income and calculating the 
difference this makes in the number of poor. Each year, the Census Bureau provides 
estimates of this type—called the Alternative Measures of Income and Poverty—for 
the U.S. based on data from the CPS; other researchers (e.g., Meyer and Holtz-Eakin, 
2001) and organizations estimate the effects in this way from other data sources as 
well as from the CPS.  
2.2.2 Background on the New York State EITC Supplement 
The New York State supplement to the Earned Income Tax Credit (NYS EITC) was 
enacted in 1994. Designed as a fixed percent of the Federal credit for single 
individuals and for families, New York State’s credit, like the Federal credit, is totally 
refundable. Initially set at 7.5 percent of the Federal credit, the NYS EITC has been 
raised six times, reaching 30 percent of the Federal credit in 2003.  
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Figure 2.2 shows the amount of the NYS EITC benefit for single individuals 
and families at different labor earning levels. As noted above, the NYS EITC follows 
the design of the federal credit, with phase-in, plateau, and phase-out regions set at the 
same earning levels as the Federal EITC. Figure 2.3 shows the NYS and Federal EITC 
for a single parent with two children, as well as the combined credit received by such 
families. The addition of the NYS EITC increases the maximum benefit for a single 
parent with two or more children by $1,290, from $4,300 to $5,590.  
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Figure 2.2. New York State EITC Schedule 2004.  Source: New York State 
Department of Taxation and Finance (2005) 
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Figure 2.3. Combined New York State and Federal EITC: Single Parent with 
Two Children 
In 2004, 1.3 million New York State families received almost $670 million in 
NYS EITC benefits, making it the most generous state EITC in the nation in terms of 
the total amount of tax credits claimed and second only to Vermont in the tax credit 
provided per family.5 Figures 2.4 and 2.5 show the total NYS EITC claimants and the 
dollar value of the total NYS EITC credits.  
                                                 
5 As of January 2006 19 states and the District of Columbia had an earned income tax credit. At 32 
percent of the federal credit, only Vermont has a higher, refundable credit that is fully linked to the 
federal credit, i.e., is a constant fraction of the Federal credit for all family types.  
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Figure 2.4. New York State EITC Claimants.  Source: New York State 
Department of Taxation and Finance (2005) 
Since the inception of the program, the number of claimants with eligible 
children rose steadily, reaching more than a million New York State families with 
children in 2002 (see Figure 2.4). The total credits granted increased far more rapidly 
than claimants—reaching almost $700 million in 2003 (2003 dollars). The rapid rise in 
total credits was the result of a number of factors, most importantly the fourfold 
increase in the New York State credit from 7.5 percent to 30 percent of the Federal 
credit, and the rising number of eligible working families. Adjustments to the Federal 
credit—including extensions of the plateau and phase-out range for married couples, 
and parameter increases to adjust for inflation—also contributed to the increase in 
total State credits.  
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Figure 2.5. Total Credits: New York State Earned Income Tax Credit: 1994-
2004.  Source: New York State Department of Taxation and Finance (2005) 
As the EITC has been shown to increase employment and labor earnings, and 
decrease poverty, an expansion of the EITC presents a politically and fiscally 
attractive method of reducing poverty rates. Any state looking to increase the incomes 
of low-income families and reduce poverty should first consider implementing an 
EITC supplement, or expanding their existing EITC supplement. The methods 
outlined here present a straightforward method of incorporating the behavioral labor 
supply incentives created by the EITC program into an assessment of the costs and 
benefits of utilizing the EITC program to increase employment and income, and 
reduce poverty. 
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2.3. Literature Review 
In order to simulate an expansion of the NYS EITC, information is required on the 
extent to which an EITC increase results in non-employed people entering the labor 
market as well as the extent to which those already employed change their hours 
worked. The existing empirical literature on the impact of the EITC on employment 
has generated numerous estimates of the elasticity of labor force participation (LFP) to 
net income, which can be used to simulate the number of people entering into the 
labor market for a given change in net income. As a simplifying assumption for the 
simulation, all persons who enter the labor force are assumed to become employed.  
Simulating the change in hours worked for those already employed is 
significantly more complicated, since it requires information on both the substitution 
(as measured by the uncompensated wage elasticity for a given change in the EITC) 
and income (as measured by the income elasticity for a given change in the EITC) 
effects of a change in the price of labor caused by a change in the marginal tax rate, 
and because the change in marginal tax rate varies over the three EITC regions. 
Though some of the existing empirical literature on the EITC has calculated the net 
change in hours worked after previous expansions of the EITC, these estimates can not 
directly be used to simulate future changes to the EITC. Instead, simulating the change 
in hours worked requires using estimates of the substitution effect and the income 
effect from the labor supply literature as done in GAO (1993), and Scholz (1996). The 
remainder of this section serves to describe the simulation method employed by 
Scholz (1996) in detail, as well as surveys the other studies’ estimates of the elasticity 
of LFP to net income, and the change in hours worked caused by previous expansions 
of the EITC. 
Scholz (1996) simulates the change in annual hours worked effected by the 
1996 expansion of the EITC using substitution and income elasticities estimated by 
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MaCurdy et al. (1990), Triest (1990), and Hausman (1981) as his lower-bound, 
preferred, and upper-bound estimates, respectively. He first estimates the value of the 
EITC that each family in his sample from the 1990 Survey of Income and Program 
Participation (SIPP) would receive in 1993 and 1996. The change in net wages, 
holding constant all taxes except the EITC, and the change in virtual income is then 
calculated for each family.6 He uses these three elasticities to simulate how program 
changes on net wages and virtual income, respectively, impact hours worked within 
each region of the EITC.  
Scholz (1996)’s preferred simulation results, using the Triest (1990) 
specifications, for those who were working at the time of the 1996 expansion of the 
EITC were that those in the phase-in range increase their hours worked by 4 percent; 
those in the plateau reduce their hours by 0.2 percent; and those in the phase-out 
region reduce their hours by 1.1 percent. But because significantly more people were 
in the plateau and phase-out regions, he found that total hours of work fell by 54.5 
million.  
However this decline in hours worked by those who were employed was more 
than offset by the movement into employment of those who were not employed at the 
time of the 1996 expansion. Scholz (1996) estimated that net labor earnings of single 
parents not in the labor market at the time of the 1996 expansion would increase by 15 
percent. This increased overall labor force participation of single parents from 65.5 
percent before the change to 72.1 percent after the change. One can not directly obtain 
an elasticity of LFP with respect to net income from the information provided in 
Scholz (1996). However, Hotz and Scholz (2003), which reviews the literature on the 
                                                 
6 Virtual income is the sum of non-earned income and the implicit lump sum subsidy generated by a 
progressive tax system, which is equal to the difference between the taxes an individual would pay if 
they faced their marginal tax rate over the full range of their taxable income and the amount of tax they 
actually pay (Triest, 1993 pp.3-4).  
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EITC including the Scholz (1996) paper, does so.7 Based on that information, the 
value would be approximately 1.46.8  
Scholz (1996) assumed that new labor market entrants, whether single parents 
or a parent in a two-parent family, would work an average of 20 hours a week for 20 
weeks a year. Thus, he found they provided 145 million new hours of work in the 
labor market. Thus these added hours more than offset the decrease in hours of those 
already in the work force, so that total hours worked based on Scholz’s best estimates 
increased by 90.5 million hours. 
As mentioned above, the analysis of the impact of the EITC must be separated 
into an analysis of its impact on those in the labor force and those not currently in the 
labor force. While Scholz (1996) provides a framework for the analysis of those 
currently in the labor force, providing a range of estimates for those not currently in 
the labor force requires several estimates of the elasticity of labor force participation to 
net income. One often used estimate of the elasticity of labor force participation to net 
income comes from Eissa and Liebman (1996), who use data for the years 1985 to 
1987 and 1989 to 1991 from the March supplement to the CPS to estimate the effects 
of the 1986 EITC expansion on labor supply. The authors estimate a difference-in-
difference model of the labor supply response of single women with children, relative 
to a control group of all unmarried females without children. As a test of robustness, 
they also estimate the change in the labor supply response for women with children, 
with and without a high school education, relative to women without children, with 
and without a high school education, respectively. The difference-in-difference results 
suggest the 1987 expansion of the EITC resulted in an increase in the labor force 
                                                 
7 To calculate elasticities of labor force participation to net income, Hotz and Scholz (2003) use average 
tax changes as reported in Meyer and Rosenbaum (1999, appendix table 1), average wages from the 
respective papers, and average hours worked for single women from Eissa and Liebman (1996). 
8 Scholz (1996) estimated that the labor force participation of persons in two-parent families who were 
not employed at the time of the 1996 expansion only increased by 0.4 percentage points. 
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participation of single women with children of 2.4 percentage points relative to the 
aggregate and with high school control groups, and a 4.1 percentage point increase 
using the less than high school control group, implying an elasticity of LFP to net 
income of 1.16 (Hotz and Scholz, 2003). Eissa and Liebman then estimate a probit 
model for labor force participation, and find that the 1987 expansion of the EITC 
increased the probability of participation by eligible women by 1.9 percentage points. 
The authors also estimated the change in hours worked resulting from the expansion of 
the EITC, and find a statistically insignificant effect.9  
Another estimate of the elasticity of labor force participation to net income 
comes from Keane and Moffitt (1998). Using data from the fourth wave of the 1994 
SIPP, Keane and Moffitt (1998) estimate a structural model of labor supply and 
participation in programs such as the EITC, food stamps, and AFDC for single women 
with children. Examining the changes in the EITC program over the period 1984 to 
1996 they estimate that the EITC increased the labor force participation of single 
women with children from 65.4 percent to 76.1 percent; implying an elasticity of labor 
force participation to employment of approximately 0.96 (Hotz and Scholz, 2003). 
Meyer and Rosenbaum (2001) use data from the 1985 to 1997 March 
supplement to the CPS, as well as the 1984 to 1996 monthly outgoing rotation group, 
to estimate the impact of the tenfold increase in EITC benefits between 1984 and 1996 
in the employment of single mothers. The authors use difference-in-difference 
methods to compare the employment of single women with children to single women 
without children. They also estimate a structural model of employment, which exploits 
cross-state and family type variation in tax and program treatment. The authors 
                                                 
9 This is a somewhat surprising finding given the labor supply parameters estimated by MaCurdy et al. 
(1990), Triest (1990), and Hausman (1981). One possible explanation is that at the time the Federal 
EITC benefit was still a new and relatively small program so that its net effect was more difficult to 
capture empirically. Alternatively, it may be that its potential beneficiaries were less familiar with the 
structure of the program and less responsive to its incentives.  
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conclude that the EITC expansion increased employment by 7.2 percentage points, or 
approximately 60 percent of total employment growth, over the 1984 to 1996 period. 
These results imply an elasticity of LFP to net income of approximately 0.70 (Hotz 
and Scholz, 2003). 
The most recent work, Hotz et al., (2006), uses California administrative data 
on families trying to make the transition from welfare to work, which includes their 
tax returns, to estimate the labor supply effect of the EITC. Using a difference-in-
difference model they exploit the differential expansions of the EITC program over 
the 1990s for families with one child, two children, or three or more children. The 
authors find that the expansion significantly increased the employment of those who 
benefited. Specifically, for a family with two children, they find an elasticity of LFP to 
net income of 1.3, and that the expansion of the EITC increased employment by 3.2 
percentage points.  
Following Schulz (1996), the MaCurdy et al. (1990), Triest (1990), and 
Hausman (1981) substitution and income elasticities are used to simulate low, 
medium, and high estimates of the effect of an expansion of the New York State EITC 
supplement on work, income, and poverty for those currently in the labor force. For 
those not currently in the labor force, the elasticities of labor force participation to net 
income estimated in Meyer and Rosenbaum (2001), Keane and Moffitt (1998), and 
Eissa and Liebman (1996) are used to simulate low, medium, and high estimates of the 
effect of an expansion of the New York State EITC supplement on work, income, and 
poverty.  
This paper extends the existing literature by building on the methods employed 
by Scholz (1996) to simulate the expansion of a state EITC supplement, and examine 
the effect on labor supply, income, poverty, and program expenditures. Moreover, this 
paper generates estimates of the impact of an EITC expansion on income, poverty and 
60 
program expenditure excluding behavioral effects, which allows for a direct 
comparison of estimates including and excluding behavioral effects. The major 
contribution of this paper is its focus on the more policy relevant aspects of an EITC 
expansion; mainly its impact on those not in the labor force, poverty rates, and state 
EITC program expenditures. It also emphasizes the importance to policy makers of 
including behavioral estimates in models of the impact of the EITC.  
2.4. Data 
This simulation uses data from the Current Population Survey (CPS) Annual Social 
and Economic Supplement (ASEC) March 2005 (2004 income year) to simulate the 
effect of an expansion of the New York State EITC supplement on employment, hours 
worked, income, and poverty for New York State residents. The CPS is a monthly 
survey of approximately 60,000 households, of which approximately 1,100 are from 
New York State. The CPS is a nationally representative sample of the civilian non-
institutionalized population. It is administered to newly recruited households for 4 
consecutive months; they then go un-interviewed for 8 months, after which they are 
interviewed for an additional 4 consecutive months. The CPS ASEC is a supplement 
to the monthly CPS, which is conducted in March of each year. The ASEC surveys 
approximately 100,000 households, or 200,000 persons, and provides in-depth 
information on employment, income, non-cash benefit receipt, and migration.  
Given that the data are for tax year 2004, the EITC parameters for tax year 
2004 are used in the simulation. Eligibility for the EITC, as well as the value of the 
Federal credit, is determined by the Census Bureau using a tax simulation. To 
determine eligibility, the Census Bureau runs each tax unit through a tax simulation to 
estimate their Federal tax liabilities and the value of any tax credits. The Federal value 
of the EITC is included in the CPS as a family-level variable. The Census Bureau tax 
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simulation assumes a 100 percent take-up rate for the EITC. That is, those deemed 
eligible for the credit by the tax simulation are assumed to receive the EITC and those 
not eligible are assumed not to apply. The state supplemental estimates are based on 
the value of the Federal EITC such families receive. 
2.5. Empirical Methods 
This section begins with a theoretical discussion of how the EITC program affects 
labor supply. It then describes the alternative definition of family income used in the 
calculation of poverty status. It then proceed to outline in detail the methods used to 
simulate the effect of an expansion of the New York State EITC supplement on 
employment, hours worked, income, and poverty status. Discussion is done separately 
for those not currently in the labor force and those in the labor force, respectively, 
based on the theoretical model. The simulation starts from the current 30 percent New 
York State Supplement to the Federal EITC and increases the value of the supplement 
in increments of 5 percentage points to 35 percent, 40 percent, and 45 percent of the 
Federal EITC benefit. At each supplement level the change in employment, hours 
worked, income, and poverty status relative to the current numbers are reported for 
those currently in the labor force and those not in the labor force separately.  
2.5.1 Theoretical Predictions 
Labor supply models based on microeconomic theory assume that workers have a 
fixed amount of time which they divide between work and leisure. Potential workers 
have a reservation wage (level of compensation) below which they will not work at 
all. Once an offer wage exceeds their reservation wage they will work, but the number 
of hours worked depends on the wage rate offered. Hence, the theoretical effect of the 
EITC on the decision to work for unmarried individuals is unambiguously positive. 
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Because the EITC unambiguously raises the offer wage it can only increase the 
likelihood that an eligible person will work. However, the availability of the EITC to 
married people results in less obvious overall employment outcomes. While those 
taking advantage of the EITC may enter the workforce, the increased income to the 
family could reduce the employment of other family members. Because leisure is a 
normal good (more of it is demanded as income increases), this increased income 
could lead to another earner in the family reducing overall hours worked and possibly 
leaving the labor force (Ellwood, 2001). Following Scholz (1996), it is assumed that 
all labor supply decisions are made holding constant the other spouse’s earnings and 
that all persons who enter the labor force in response to the EITC expansion find 
employment, in order to simplify the analysis.10 In other words, in this paper labor 
force is equated with working status and the corresponding labels are interchangeably 
used. This assumption appears reasonable given that it is unlikely that a single mother 
would enter the labor force, and potentially give up her non-labor market sources of 
income, unless they were able to obtain employment. 
The effect of the EITC on hours worked for those already in the labor force is 
more ambiguous. Microeconomic theory argues that if the EITC changes the value of 
an additional hour of work, it will also change the income associated with that 
additional hour of work. The change in the value of an additional hour of work is 
referred to as the “substitution” effect and it implies that if workers receive a higher 
return from an additional hour of work they will choose to work more and reduce their 
leisure time, all else equal. However, a change in the income associated with that 
additional hour of work is referred to as the “income effect” and, because leisure is a 
                                                 
10 Though Eissa and Hoynes (2005) find evidence that increases in the EITC result in modest reductions 
in the employment and hours worked of married women, these effects are so small that they are 
unlikely to affect the results of this simulation. 
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normal good, an increase in compensation will result in workers working less and 
taking more leisure.  
The EITC program has three distinct regions—the phase-in, plateau, and 
phase-out—with the substitution and income effects operating differently in each 
region, resulting in a different impact on hours worked. Figure 2.1 presents the value 
of the Federal EITC relative to family income for single individuals, individuals with 
one eligible child, and individuals with two or more eligible children. For those in the 
phase-in region of the credit, segment A to B, the effect of the EITC is ambiguous. 
The rise in compensation will increase work because of the substitution effect but 
decrease work because of the income effect. Hence the net effect of the rise in net 
compensation due to the EITC in this region is uncertain.  
For those in the region between the maximum eligible earnings and the 
beginning of the phase-out range, segment B to C, the EITC will lead to a decrease in 
hours worked. The value of an additional hour of work is the same as it is in the 
absence of the EITC so there is no substitution effect. But, because the EITC provides 
those in this region with greater income than they would have in the absence of the 
EITC, hours worked will decline due to the income effect. 
For those in the phase-out region of the credit, segment C to D, the EITC will 
decrease hours worked. The phase-out rate of the EITC means that the value of an 
additional hour of work is lower than it is in the absence of the EITC because one 
must “pay back” part of the EITC, leading to a substitution effect that reduces hours of 
work. In addition, those in this region still have more income for a given amount of 
work than they would in the absence of the EITC and, thus, the income effect will 
reduce hours worked.  
Figure 2.6 presents the initial budget constraint (A) faced by a single mother 
with two children whose hourly wage rate is $10.00 per hour and must decide how 
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many hours to work. Imposed on this initial budget constraint is a second budget 
constraint (B) that includes the current Federal EITC. As can be seen, in the phase-in 
region (B) has a higher slope than (A). This reflects the added compensation to work 
from the EITC. In the plateau region, (B) is parallel to (A). While there is no longer 
additional compensation for work in this region, the single mother is allowed to keep 
all the EITC benefits already gained. In the phase-out region budget constraint (B) has 
a lower slope than budget constraint (A). This reflects the loss of EITC benefits 
previously gained and hence the lower than $10.00 net return to work. Budget 
constraint (C) reflects the effect of the current 30 percent New York State supplement 
to the Federal EITC. Because this supplement is a fixed percentage of the Federal 
EITC, it will increase (decrease) the slope in the phase-in (phase-out) region but not 
change the point with respect to hours worked at which total EITC benefits are 
maximized or where the plateau ends or the location of the breakeven point. The net 
effect of the EITC in these three regions will continue to be ambiguous in the first and 
negative in the second and third for those who are initially in these regions. This will 
also be true of any increases in the New York State supplement as can be seen in 
budget constraint (D) which reflects an increase in the supplement to 45 percent.  
Figure 2.1 shows how Federal EITC benefits change at different labor earnings 
levels for three types of families. In Figure 2.3 this same kind of relationship is shown 
for the single mother discussed in Figure 2.2 but shows how the benefit relationship 
changes when the 30 percent and then 45 percent New York State supplement to her 
Federal EITC benefits are added.  
Figures 2.2 and 2.3 illustrate that the addition of the State supplement increases 
the rate of ascent and descent of the credit relative to the Federal EITC alone, which 
potentially alters the net impact on hours worked of the substitution and income 
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effects in each region, as additional work is now more lucrative in the phase-in region, 
and more punitive in the phase-out region.  
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Figure 2.6. Budget Constraint for a Single Taxpayer with Two or More Children 
in 2004.  Source: Author’s Calculations 
2.5.2. Alternative Definitions of Family Income 
One component of the simulation is estimating changes in poverty resulting from 
changes in the generosity of New York State’s EITC supplement program. The 
standard definition of poverty adds up labor earnings and cash welfare payments and 
compares this to a family-size adjusted poverty line. However, given that this analysis 
66 
focuses on the EITC, it would be inappropriate to use a definition of income for 
determining poverty which excluded the substantial contribution of the EITC to the 
incomes of low-income families. The Census Bureau has developed several alternative 
income measures, which are used to examine the change in the official poverty rate 
that would result from the inclusion of income from programs, such as the EITC, in 
the income-to-needs calculation.11 Here an expanded definition of income is used 
based on the Census Bureau alternative income measure called MI-Tx+NC to 
determine poverty status, as this measure captures the substantial contribution of 
programs such as the EITC to the incomes of low-income families.12 The Census 
Bureau MI-Tx+NC measure adds the value of in-kind transfers (food stamps, school 
lunch, housing subsidies, and home energy subsidies), as well as the Federal EITC to 
family income, but subtracts state, Federal, and FICA tax payments from family 
income. The income measure used in this paper further includes the value of State 
EITC benefits. In order to determine whether persons in a family are poor a family’s 
expanded alternative income value is compared to their corresponding poverty line, 
and if below the poverty line, the individuals in that family are defined as poor. This 
paper only applies this alternative definition of poverty. 
2.5.3. Simulation Methods for those Persons Not in the Labor Force at the Time of the 
Expansion 
Because, by definition, the data contains far less information on the labor force 
characteristics of those not in the labor force, a significant number of assumptions are 
required in order to simulate the effect of a state EITC supplement expansion on the 
                                                 
11 See Dalaker 2005 for a more detailed description of the alternative poverty measures. 
12 MI-Tx+NC refers to money income minus taxes plus non-cash benefits. It is possible that Tx is 
negative since the EITC is a refundable tax credit and hence can lead to some person’s receiving “tax 
benefits” from the government rather than paying taxes to the government. In this case Tx is added to 
and not subtracted from money income. 
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employment, number of hours worked, income, and poverty status of those not in the 
labor force. Specifically, we do not observe the wage that these individuals would 
receive should they choose to enter the labor force, nor do we observe the annual 
number of hours they would choose to work. Thus three key assumptions are made 
regarding the characteristics single mothers would have should they enter the labor 
market. The first assumption is that all those not in the labor force who choose to enter 
the labor force as a result of the EITC expansion would earn the current New York 
State minimum wage of $7.15. The one previous study to simulate the change in 
income for those who enter the labor force—Scholz (1996)—uses predicted wages. 
However, this study makes a more conservative assumption of the earnings of labor 
market entrants, and assumes they earn the NY State minimum wage. The second 
assumption is that labor market entrants would work the same number of hours as the 
average person of similar characteristics who is currently in the labor force. For 
example, the average single mother works 1633 hours per year in the 2005 CPS ASEC 
and so single mothers outside the labor force are assumed to work 1633 hours per year 
should they choose to enter the labor force. Lastly, given the complexity of calculating 
benefit receipt from the numerous income support programs available to low-income 
working families—and included in the alternative measure of family income—it is 
simply assumed that all persons who choose to join the labor force as a result of an 
EITC expansion had been poor and become non-poor.13  
                                                 
13 Though the assumption that all persons who join the labor force as a result of an EITC expansion 
become non-poor may seem rather strong, it is actually quite reasonable given that just by counting 
wages, current combined New York State and Federal EITC benefits, the refundable portion of the 
Federal Child Tax Credit and subtracting FICA taxes for a single mother with two or more children who 
works 1,633 hours per year at the minimum wage of $7.15 family income would be $15,733—just 
beyond the poverty line of $15,670 for a family of three. Moreover, the inclusion of the value of in-kind 
benefits such as housing subsidies, food stamps, home energy subsidies, and school lunches—as is done 
when calculating alternative family income—would push the family even further above the poverty 
line. On average, a family with two or more children earning approximately $11,500 in wages received 
about $800 worth of in-kind benefits. Even if the assumption that a new labor force entrant would work 
1,633 hours per year is viewed as high, one should point out that even working half-time (20 hours per 
week, 52 weeks per year) a single mother with two children would only need a wage rate of $10 per 
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Given the assumptions cited above, the primary simulation method for the 
effect of an EITC expansion on those not in the labor force at the time of the 
expansion of EITC involves determining the number of these persons who would enter 
the labor force for a given change in the EITC supplement. This is done using 
elasticities of labor force participation to net income drawn from the existing literature 
on the effect of the EITC on labor supply. An elasticity of labor force participation to 
net income gives the percent change in labor force participation for a given percent 
change in net income—where net income is defined as income after State and Federal 
taxes, including EITC benefits, and FICA taxes. The percent change in net income for 
those not in the labor force is calculated by taking the current net income a person 
would receive were they participating in the labor force at the assumed wage and 
number of hours, and then calculating the additional income they would receive from 
each expansion of the New York State EITC supplement. For example, a single 
mother with one child earning $11,676 in labor income would receive $1,845 back 
from the Federal and State governments after adding in state and federal EITC benefits 
and subtracting out FICA taxes yielding a net income of $13,521. An expansion of the 
New York State EITC Supplement to 35 percent of the federal benefit would add $130 
to her net income (0.96%), an expansion to 40 percent would add $261 to her net 
income (1.93%), and an expansion to 45 percent would add $391 to her net income 
(2.89%). A single mother with two children earning $11,676 in labor income would 
receive $4,057 back from the Federal and State governments after adding in state and 
federal EITC benefits and subtracting out FICA taxes yielding a net income of 
$15,733. An expansion of the New York State EITC Supplement to 35 percent of the 
federal benefit would add $215 to her net income (1.37%), an expansion to 40 percent 
                                                                                                                                            
hour to exceed the poverty line once all transfers and in-kind benefits were included in family income. 
In addition, single mothers who do not work have poverty rates above 80% and it is reasonable to 
assume all those who join the labor force are poor. (Source: All figures were calculated by the author 
using the CPS ASEC 2005.) 
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would add $430 to her net income (2.73%), and an expansion to 45 percent would add 
$645 to her net income (4.10%). 
Separate elasticity estimates exist for men, married women, and single mothers 
as their labor supply decisions are fundamentally different. Back of the envelope 
calculations using an elasticity of labor force participation to income of 0.03 for men 
and 0.26 for married women from Eissa and Hoynes (2004) and the EITC program 
parameters indicated that an EITC supplement expansion would only induce labor 
force entry by single mothers. Men are excluded as a result of their very low elasticity, 
implying minimal changes in participation even for large changes in the EITC benefit. 
Married women are excluded because a married woman entering the labor force faces 
a very high marginal tax rate, as the EITC program only extended the phase-in and 
plateau regions by $1,000 for a married couple in 2004, which make changes in net 
family income small or even zero. Lastly, though single childless persons can be 
eligible for the EITC, they can only earn a maximum state and federal benefit of $507, 
which is completely phased out if they earn more than $11,490. These EITC 
parameters for the childless yield very small changes in net income for any reasonable 
number of annual hours worked. With the exclusion of these three groups, the 
simulation for those not in the labor force is only conducted for single mothers.  
In order to provide low, medium, and high estimates of the effect of an EITC 
supplement expansion on the employment of single mothers, three different elasticities 
of labor force participation to net income are employed in the simulation. The three 
elasticities are: 0.69 from Meyer and Rosenbaum (2001) for a lower bound; 0.96 from 
Keane and Moffitt (1998) for the medium; and 1.16 from Eissa and Liebman (1996) 
for an upper bound. These elasticities were selected as they covered the range of 
estimates found in the existing EITC literature. These elasticities imply that for a 10 
percent increase in net income, labor force participation of single mothers will 
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increase by 6.9 percent, 9.6 percent, and 11.6 percent, respectively. These and other 
elasticities of labor force participation to net income are presented in Table 2.2 in 
order to give the reader a sense for the range of estimates produced by the EITC 
literature.  
The next step involved producing the labor force participation rates for single 
mothers. Given that mothers with one child and mothers with two or more children 
participate in the labor force at different rates, labor force participation rates were 
estimated separately. Estimates from the 2005 CPS ASEC indicate that there were 
394,915 single mothers with one child in New York State and their labor force 
participation rate was 79.47 percent, and that there 321,611 single mothers with two or 
more children and their labor force participation rate was 70.88 percent. With labor 
force participation rates for these two groups, the simulated changes in employment 
among those not in the labor force were obtained by applying the above mentioned 
percent changes in net income for a given change in the EITC supplement with the 
three elasticities of labor force participation to net income to the respective labor force 
participation rates yielding percentage point changes in the labor force participation 
rate. These percentage point changes were then converted into actual numbers of 
persons by applying them to the respective total populations of single mothers. For 
example, a one percentage point increase in the labor force participation rate of single 
mothers with one child would increase the number in the labor force by 3,949 mothers 
and affect 7,898 persons (1 mother and 1 child in each family). For single mothers 
with two or more children, one percentage point increase in their labor force 
participation rate would increase the number in the labor force by 3,216 mothers and 
affect 11,256 persons (1 mother and an average 2.5 children in each family). All these 
persons are then assumed to have been poor and exit poverty based on the above 
mentioned assumptions. 
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The change in employment, hours worked, and earnings for those persons not 
in the labor force at the time of the expansion of the EITC are presented in the “Not in 
Labor Force” columns of Table 2.3, while the average values are presented in Table 
2.4. Detailed poverty numbers are presented in Table 2.5. The poverty numbers are 
separated into those not in the labor force and those in the labor force given that the 
estimates for those not in the labor force at the time of the EITC expansion are likely 
to be less precise than for those who are employed at the time of the EITC expansion. 
2.5.4. Simulation Methods for those Persons in the Labor Force at the Time of the 
Expansion  
The simulations of the effect of increases in the New York State EITC Supplement for 
those not in the labor force presented here are based on those first developed in Scholz 
(1996). The procedure begins by determining who is currently eligible for the EITC 
and their EITC region—phase-in, plateau, or phase-out. EITC eligibility is determined 
using the Census Bureau-derived variable eit_cred, the estimated value of the family’s 
Federal EITC, in the CPS data. If the eit_cred value is positive a person is eligible for 
the EITC. Their region is then assigned based on their own wages, or their wages plus 
their spouse’s wages where appropriate, and their number of children. As discussed in 
the theoretical background on the EITC’s labor supply effects, it is necessary to know 
the person’s EITC region to determine the substitution effect since the new marginal 
tax rate an individual faces, which is relevant for the calculation of the substitution 
effect, depends on the person’s EITC region. 
For those in the labor force, the most important aspect of the simulation is 
determining the change in hours worked per year for a given change in the EITC 
supplement. The change in hours worked is the net of the substitution and income 
effects resulting from changes in income. As calculating the change in hours worked is 
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significantly different for the substitution and income effects, they are calculated 
separately, and then combined at a later stage.  
As with the simulation for those not in the labor force, low, medium, and high 
estimates of the changes in hours worked, income, and poverty in response to a change 
in the EITC supplement are provided by using three sets of uncompensated wage and 
income elasticities drawn from the previous literature. Specifically, estimates of the 
uncompensated wage elasticity and income elasticity are obtained from MaCurdy et 
al. (1990), Triest (1990), and Hausman (1981) for both women and men as lower-
bound, medium, and upper-bound estimates, respectively, as done in Dickert et al. 
(1995) and Schulz (1996). These elasticities are presented in the last six columns of 
Table 2.2. 
For the substitution effect, the change in hours worked is calculated by 
applying the uncompensated wage elasticity to the percent change in the marginal tax 
rate an individual faces as a result of a change in the New York State EITC 
supplement (i.e. the numerator is the change in the EITC and the denominator includes 
all taxes, not simply the EITC.)14 An individual’s marginal tax rate is calculated as the 
15.3 percent FICA rate, minus their federal EITC rate plus their federal tax rate minus 
their state EITC rate plus their state tax rate. Though the New York State EITC benefit 
is a set rate of the federal benefit, this implicitly alters the rate at which the credit is 
accumulated in the phase-in region and withdrawn in the phase-out region.  
                                                 
14 Many families who receive the EITC also receive in-kind benefits, such as food stamps, which are 
phased-out as income increases. Hence changes in the EITC program that increased countable income 
in these programs, reducing their value would affect the implicit marginal tax rate faced by a worker. 
However, the EITC benefit itself is not counted in the calculation of in-kind benefits. But any labor 
earnings increase caused by a change in the EITC benefit rules would be affected because labor 
earnings are countable income in such programs. The denominator used to calculate the percent change 
in the marginal tax rate here does not include the implicit tax rates on labor earnings from lost benefits 
from these in-kind programs. The microsimulation required to capture those rates is beyond the scope 
of this paper. However, given the relatively small change in labor earnings the simulation produces, the 
addition of these implicit taxes is unlikely to substantially affect the results presented here. 
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Table 2.2. Labor supply parameters for EITC simulation 
   
 
Elasticity of Labor Force 
Participation to Net 
Income  
Uncompensated Wage 
Elasticity  Income Elasticity 
 Men
Married
Women
Single 
Women   Men 
Married 
Women 
Single 
Women   Men 
Married 
Women 
Single 
Women 
Elasticities for those working:            
Low: MaCurdy et al (1990)     0 0.11 0.11  0 -0.01 -0.01 
Medium: Triest (1990)     0.06 0.27 0.27  0 -0.16 -0.16 
High: Hausman (1981)     0.02 0.78 0.78  -0.17 -0.1 -0.1 
            
Elasticities for those not working:            
Low: Meyer and Rosenbaum (2001)   0.69         
Medium: Keane and Moffitt (1998)   0.96         
High: Eissa and Liebman (1996)   1.16         
            
Other elasticities from the literature:            
Dickert, Houser, and Scholz (1995)   0.85         
Eissa and Hoynes (1998) 0.03 0.29   0.06-0.07 0.08-0.52   0.0 -0.04 to -0.41  
Hotz, Mullin, and Scholz (2002)   0.97-1.69         
Keane and Moffitt (1991)            0.66     -0.24 
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Table 2.3. Changes in Employment, Hours Worked, Earnings, and State EITC Cost 
Change in Number Employed
Ages 18-64 
Change in Hours Worked 
(in 1000s) 
Change in Labor Earnings 
(in $1000s) 
Change in State EITC Benefits
(in $1000s) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
State 
Supplement as 
a Percent of the 
Federal EITC Working 
Not 
Working Total Working 
Not 
Working Total Working 
Not 
Working Total Working 
Not 
Working Total 
Low Estimate:†            
35% ---- 4,238 4,238 -121 6,921 6,799 -5,994 49,482 43,488 79,644 5,138 84,783 
40% ---- 5,896 5,896 -347 9,629 9,281 -12,912 68,845 55,933 159,477 7,149 166,626 
45% ---- 7,125 7,125 -563 11,635 11,071 -19,775 83,187 63,413 238,900 8,638 247,538 
Medium Estimate:‡            
35% ---- 8,473 8,473 -1,201 13,836 12,635 -18,368 98,927 80,559 80,864 11,742 92,605 
40% ---- 11,788 11,788 -2,425 19,250 16,825 -37,710 137,637 99,928 162,267 16,336 178,603 
45% ---- 14,244 14,244 -3,867 23,260 19,393 -70,497 166,312 95,815 245,392 19,740 265,131 
High Estimate:*            
35% ---- 12,707 12,707 -1,460 20,751 19,291 -47,205 148,372 101,167 86,799 19,812 106,611 
40% ---- 17,680 17,680 -3,742 28,871 25,129 -101,393 206,430 105,037 174,929 27,565 202,493 
45% ---- 21,363 21,363  -5,951 34,886 28,935  -155,180 249,436 94,256  260,294 33,307 293,601 
Source: Author’s Calculations using Current Population Survey Annual Social and Economic Supplement (ASEC), 2005. 
Note: The estimated values at the current 30 percent NY State EITC Supplement are: 10.0 million persons employed; 1.5 billion hours worked; 
$11.8 billion in labor earnings; and 471.0 million in NY State EITC benefits paid. 
† : The low estimates are simulated using the MaCurdy et al. (1990) elasticities for those initially working and the Meyer and Rosenbaum 
(2001) elasticities for those not initially working. 
‡ : The medium estimates are simulated using the Triest (1990) elasticities for those initially working and the Keane and Moffitt (1998) 
elasticities for those not initially working. 
* : The high estimates are simulated using the Hausman (1981) elasticities for those initially working and the Eissa and Liebman (1996) 
elasticities for those not initially working. 
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Table 2.4. Simulated Changes in Average Hours Worked, Average Earnings, Average EITC Benefits, and Average 
Alternative Family Income for Various Increases in the NY State EITC Supplement 
  Working  Not Working 
  
State Supplement as a Percent 
of the Federal EITC(a)  
State Supplement as a Percent of 
the Federal EITC(b) 
  (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
  35% 40% 45%  35% 40% 45% 
Low Estimate† -0.11 -0.33 -0.53  1633.00 1633.00 1633.00 
Medium Estimate‡ -1.14 -2.30 -3.67  1633.00 1633.00 1633.00 Average Change in Hours Worked Per Year Per Person 
High Estimate* -1.38 -3.55 -5.64  1633.00 1633.00 1633.00 
         
Low Estimate† -$6 -$12 -$19  $11,676 $11,676 $11,676 
Medium Estimate‡ -$17 -$36 -$67  $11,676 $11,676 $11,676 Average Change in Annual Labor Earnings 
High Estimate* -$45 -$96 -$147  $11,676 $11,676 $11,676 
Source: Author’s Calculations using Current Population Survey Annual Social and Economic Supplement (ASEC), 2005. 
Notes:  
(a) For those initially working the average values at the current 30 percent NY State EITC Supplement are: 1467 hours worked; $11,214 in 
labor earnings; $1,936 in EITC benefits; and Alternative Family Income of $27,399. 
(b) For those not initially working the assumed values at the current 30 percent NY State EITC Supplement are: 0 hours worked; $0 in labor 
earnings; $0 in EITC benefits; and Alternative Family Income of $8,599 (calculated from CPS). 
† : The low estimates are simulated using the MaCurdy et al. (1990) elasticities for those initially working and the Meyer and Rosenbaum 
(2001) elasticities for those not initially working. 
‡ : The medium estimates are simulated using the Triest (1990) elasticities for those initially working and the Keane and Moffitt (1998) 
elasticities for those not initially working. 
* : The high estimates are simulated using the Hausman (1981) elasticities for those initially working and the Eissa and Liebman (1996) 
elasticities for those not initially working. 
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Table 2.4. (Continued) 
  Working  Not Working 
  
State Supplement as a Percent 
of the Federal EITC(a)  
State Supplement as a Percent of 
the Federal EITC(b) 
  (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
  35% 40% 45%  35% 40% 45% 
Low Estimate† $80  $160  $240   $4,688  $4,862  $5,035  
Medium Estimate‡ $86  $173  $272   $4,688  $4,862  $5,035  Average Change in Federal and State EITC Benefits 
High Estimate* $116  $230  $347   $4,688  $4,862  $5,035  
         
Low Estimate† $77  $152  $228   $7,765  $7,939  $8,112  
Medium Estimate‡ $73  $144  $215   $7,765  $7,939  $8,112  Average Change in Alternative Family Income 
High Estimate* $75  $144  $214    $7,765  $7,939  $8,112  
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Table 2.5. Various Estimates of Reductions in Alternative Poverty Rates of All New York Residents as a Result of 
Expansion of State EITC  
     Estimated Change in the Alternative Poverty with Behavioral Effects     
 
Estimated Changes in 
Alternative Total Poverty-No 
Behavioral Effects  Low Estimates† Medium Estimates‡  High Estimates* 
Medium Estimates of 
Changes in the Alternative 
Child Poverty  
(1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)  (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) State 
Supplement 
as a 
Percent of 
the Federal 
EITC(a) 
Change in 
Poverty  
Count 
(in 1000s) 
Poverty 
Rate 
Change  
in  
Poverty  
Rate   
Change in 
Poverty 
Count 
(in 1000s)
Poverty 
Rate 
Change 
in  
Poverty 
Rates  
Change in 
Poverty 
Count 
(in 1000s) 
Poverty 
Rate 
Change in 
Poverty  
Rates   
Change in 
Poverty 
Count 
(in 1000s) 
Poverty 
Rate 
Change 
in 
Poverty 
Rates 
Change in 
Poverty 
Count 
(in 1000s)
Poverty 
Rate 
Change 
in 
Poverty 
Rates 
Working: 
35% -3    -3   -6    -16   -1  
40% -12    -15   -35    -30   -8  
45% -30    -33   -38    -39   -17  
Not Working: 
35% ----  ----  -12   -16    -20   -10  
40% ----  ----  -23   -33    -39   -21  
45% ----  ----  -35   -49    -59   -31  
Total:  
35% -3 11.75% 0.00  -15 11.67% -0.08 -22 11.63% -0.12  -35 11.56% -0.19 -12 14.82% -0.25 
40% -12 11.65% -0.10  -38 11.55% -0.20 -67 11.39% -0.35  -69 11.39% -0.36 -29 14.43% -0.64 
45% -30 11.55% -0.20   -68 11.39% -0.36  -86 11.29% -0.45   -98 11.23% -0.52  -48 14.01% -1.06 
Source: Author’s Calculations using Current Population Survey Annual Social and Economic Supplement (ASEC), 2005. 
Notes: 
(a) Alternative poverty count for all persons in NY State in 2004 was 2,233,000 and the poverty rate was 11.75%. The poverty count for all children in NY State 
in 2004 was 686,000 implying a child poverty rate of 15.07%. 
† : The low estimates are simulated using the MaCurdy et al. (1990) elasticities for those initially working and the Meyer and Rosenbaum (2001) elasticities for 
those not initially working. 
‡ : The medium estimates are simulated using the Triest (1990) elasticities for those initially working and the Keane and Moffitt (1998) elasticities for those not 
initially working. 
* : The high estimates are simulated using the Hausman (1981) elasticities for those initially working and the Eissa and Liebman (1996) elasticities for those 
not initially working. 
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Table 2.6. Comparison of Effects of EITC Expansion from 30 to 45 percent with 
and without Behavioral Responses 
    (1)  (2)  (3) 
  
Behavioral 
Effects 
(Medium 
Estimates)‡  
No Behavioral 
Effects  Difference 
Employment             
 Working 0  0  0 
 Not Working 14,244  0  14,244 
 Total 14,244  0  14,244 
       
Hours Worked (In 1000s)       
 Working -3,867  0  -3,867 
 Not Working 23,260  0  23,260 
 Total 19,393  0  19,393 
       
Labor Earnings (In 1000s)       
 Working -70,497  0  -70,497 
 Not Working 166,312  0  166,312 
 Total 95,815  0  95,815 
       
State EITC Benefits (In 1000s)       
 Working 245,392  235,513  9,879 
 Not Working 19,787  0  19,787 
 Total 265,179  235,513  29,666 
       
Family Income (In 1000s)       
 Working 226,276  235,513  -9,237 
 Not Working 93,757  0  93,757 
 Total 320,033  235,513  84,520 
       
Persons in Poverty       
 Working -37,535  -29,776  -7,759 
 Not Working -48,817  0  -48,817 
  Total -86,352   -29,776   -56,576 
Source: Author’s Calculations using Current Population Survey Annual Social and Economic 
Supplement (ASEC), 2005. 
‡ : The medium estimates are simulated using the Triest (1990) elasticities for those initially 
working and the Keane and Moffitt (1998) elasticities for those not initially working. 
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For example, a tax unit with two or more eligible children faces an implicit 
additional credit rate of 12.0 percent in the phase-in region, and an additional phase-
out rate of 6.32 percent in the phase-out region.15 An increase in the New York State 
EITC supplement rate to 35 percent would change the credit rates to 14.00 percent in 
the phase-in region and 7.37 in the phase-out region. The credit or phase-out rate of 
the EITC forms part of the marginal tax rate an individual faces in making their labor 
supply decision as it alters their after tax wage rate. An increase in the EITC credit rate 
of 1 percent increases an individual’s after-tax wage by 1 percent. Similarly, an 
increase in the phase-out rate of 1 percent decreases an individual’s after-tax wage by 
1 percent. Thus, the substitution effect positively affects hours worked in the phase-in 
region as an increase in the EITC decreases the effective marginal tax rate an 
individual faces. In the plateau region the substitution effect does not operate, as 
changes in the EITC credit or phase-out rate do not affect an individual’s effective 
marginal tax rate since their EITC benefit is neither increasing nor decreasing with 
changes in income. In the phase-out region the substitution effect negatively affects 
hours worked as an increase in the EITC’s phase-out rate increases the effective 
marginal tax rate an individual faces making an additional hour of work less lucrative. 
The marginal tax rate of a tax unit with two or more children in the phase-in 
region is the federal income tax rate plus the state income tax rate—if any earnings are 
subject to tax after deductions and exemptions—plus the FICA tax rate, minus the 
federal EITC credit rate, minus the effective New York State EITC credit rate. In this 
region most families’ deductions and exemptions will make it unlikely that they will 
be subject to federal or state income taxes, so their marginal tax rate will be: -36.7 
percent (15.3 percent FICA – 40 percent federal EITC + 0 percent federal tax rate – 12 
percent state EITC + 0 percent state tax rate). That is, with each additional dollar 
                                                 
15 The implicit New York State rates are calculated by multiplying the federal rates by 30 percent. 
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earned their net tax liability decreases by 36.7 cents. Given that the EITC is 
refundable, this is equivalent to each dollar in wages actually being worth $1.367 after 
taxes. Thus, increasing the New York State supplement to 35 percent of the federal 
credit would reduce the marginal tax rate of a tax-unit with two or more children in the 
phase-in region by an additional two percentage points as the state EITC credit rate 
would increase from 12 percent to 14 percent. With an initial marginal tax rate of -
36.7 percent, the percent change in marginal taxes equals -5.45 percent (2/-36.7). 
Taking the low uncompensated wage elasticity for women of 0.11 from MaCurdy et 
al. (1990), this 5.45 percent decrease in the marginal tax rate would result in an 
increase in hours worked of 0.6 percent (5.45*0.11).  
In the phase-out region this effect operates in reverse to reduce hours worked. 
A tax unit with two or more eligible children earning $25,000 per year faces a 
marginal tax rate of 57.18 percent (15.3 percent FICA + 21.06 percent federal EITC + 
10 percent federal tax rate + 6.32 percent state EITC + 4.5 percent state tax rate). 
Increasing the New York State EITC supplement rate to 35 percent results in her 
marginal tax rate increasing by 1.05 percentage points (1.84%), as her state marginal 
tax rate would increase to 11.87 percent. Again using the low uncompensated wage 
elasticity for women of 0.11 from MaCurdy et al. (1990), this 1.84 percent increase in 
her marginal tax rate would result in a decrease in hours worked of 0.20 percent 
(1.84*0.11). 
Since everyone in a given EITC eligibility category—childless, one child, two 
or more children—and region of the EITC faces the same percentage point change in 
their marginal tax rate with an expansion of the EITC supplement, changes in 
marginal tax rates are calculated and then assign by eligibility category and credit 
region for an expansion to a 35, 40, and then 45 percent supplement. As the marginal 
tax rate for each tax unit is provided in the CPS, calculating the percent change in the 
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marginal tax rate faced by a person after each simulated expansion of the EITC 
supplement involves simply dividing the assigned percentage point change in the 
marginal tax rate by the CPS assigned current marginal tax rate. With the percent 
change in marginal tax rate calculated, each of the three uncompensated wage 
elasticities are then applied for each of the three expansions of the credit, which yields 
low, medium, and high estimates of the change in hours worked due to the substitution 
effect at a supplement rate of 35 percent, 40 percent, and 45 percent.  
For the income effect, determining the change in hours worked is similar to the 
process used to determine the change in employment for those not in the labor force. 
As with those not in the labor force, calculations are made on the basis of net income, 
which is defined as income after State and Federal taxes, including EITC benefits, and 
FICA taxes. However, for those in the labor force it is possible to calculate actual net 
income based on income and taxes reported in the CPS. In order to apply the income 
elasticities a person’s percent change in net income is calculated by determining the 
change in the value of the New York State EITC supplement for a given increase in 
the supplement rate at their current CPS determined income level and dividing this 
change in their supplement by their net income. The variable eit_cred is used as the 
basis for the estimate of the value of the New York State EITC supplement. Beginning 
in the March 2004 CPS, the Census Bureau included the value of the state EITC 
supplement in the variable for total state taxes. However, given that the state tax is a 
net value, the amount of the state EITC is not directly available.16 Therefore, estimates 
of a tax unit’s New York state EITC value are obtained by multiplying the value of the 
Federal credit provided in the CPS by 0.30. The value of a change in the New York 
State EITC supplement to 35 percent, 40 percent, and 45 percent of the federal credit 
                                                 
16 Unless the value of the state EITC supplement exceeds a person’s total tax liabilities, the net state tax 
variable will show a positive amount of taxes owed. The value of the state EITC supplement is not 
provided as a separate variable. Therefore it is necessary to impute the value of the state EITC 
supplement from the value of the Federal EITC, which is reported. 
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was then calculated by multiplying each family’s eit_cred value by 0.05, 0.10, and 
0.15 respectively. 
In order to determine the percent change in hours worked due to the income 
effect, the percent change in net income that we determined for each person at each of 
the three expansions of the EITC supplement is taken and applied to the gender 
appropriate low, medium, and high income elasticities. With both the income and 
substitution effects now estimated for all three simulated EITC supplement expansions 
using the low, medium, and high elasticities, the effects on hours worked are added 
together to determine the net percent change in hours worked by each person. This is 
then converted into actual hours by multiplying the percent change in hours worked by 
the number of hours worked per year. 
Based on the net change in hours worked per year a person’s net income is 
recalculated by multiplying their net of tax wage rate by the change in the number of 
hours they worked and adding this value to their previous net income. For example, a 
person who reduced their hours worked by 10 hours per year as a result of the EITC 
expansion, who earned $10 per hour, and faced a marginal tax rate of 50 percent 
would have their net income reduced by $50 ($10*0.5 tax rate*-10 hours). Given that 
this change in income may have resulted in a person moving into, or out of poverty, 
poverty status is recalculated using the new value for net income.  
Due to the complexity of recalculating the value of food stamps, school 
lunches, housing subsidies, and home energy subsidies for a given change in earnings 
due to an EITC expansion, the value of these benefits is held constant, so changes in 
alternative family income only result from changes in net of tax wage earnings. As the 
results of the simulation indicate only minor changes in labor earnings for the average 
person, the value of these benefits is unlikely to be significantly altered were their 
value to be recalculated at the new income level. Moreover, the net effect on average 
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alternative family income is ambiguous. Since EITC benefits are not counted as 
income in determining the amount of in-kind benefits received from these programs to 
the degree persons in the plateau and phase-out region reduce their labor earnings, 
potentially increasing the value of their in-kind benefits, this will offset the decline in 
potential in-kind benefits of those in the phase-in region who increase their labor 
earnings. In order to determine changes in poverty, the alternative income value is 
compared to the poverty line with each step in the simulated expansion of the New 
York State EITC supplement, and if below the poverty line, the individuals in that 
family are defined as poor.  
2.6. Empirical Results 
Table 2.3 presents the change in employment based on the low, medium, and high 
elasticities of LFP to net income, and hours worked, labor earnings, and NYS EITC 
benefits based on the low, medium, and high labor supply parameters, respectively. 
This table divides the effect between those in the labor force (initially working) and 
those not in the labor force (those not initially working). With regards to changes in 
employment, under no set of parameters would anyone currently in the labor force exit 
the labor force (column 1), as those who originally chose to work would not stop 
working as working becomes even more rewarding. However, there are a significant 
number of persons who enter the labor force (column 2) as a result of an EITC 
expansion. As discussed above, the only persons induced to enter the labor force given 
the assumptions of this model are single mothers. Focusing on an expansion of the 
NYS EITC to 45 percent of the federal credit, it is estimated that at the low end an 
additional 7,125 single mothers would enter the labor force, 14,244 would enter under 
the medium estimate, and 21,363 would enter under the high estimates (column 3).  
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Columns 4, 5, and 6 of Table 2.3 present the estimated change in hours 
worked. As expected from the previous literature and the theoretical assumptions, the 
number of hours worked by those currently in the labor force declines with an 
expansion of the NYS EITC. Estimates of the decline in hours worked with an 
expansion to a 45 percent NYS EITC range from 563,000 hours per year to 5.951 
million hours per year for those currently in the labor force (column 4). However, the 
decline in hours worked by those in the labor force is more than offset across all 
specifications by the increase in hours worked by those not in the labor force prior to 
the expansion. The increase in hours worked by those not previously in the labor force 
is estimated to range from 11.635 million to 34.886 million (column 5). The net effect 
is an increase in hours worked of between 11.071 million and 28.935 million (column 
6).  
Columns 7, 8, and 9 of Table 2.3 present the estimated change in labor 
earnings. Owing to the decline in hours worked by those in the labor force, an 
expansion to a 45 percent NYS EITC is estimated to reduce their labor earnings by 
between $19.775 million and $155.180 million (column 7). Again, this is more than 
offset by the estimated increase in the labor earnings of those entering the labor force 
of between $83.187 million and $249.436 million (column 8). On net, this implies that 
an expansion to a 45 percent NYS EITC yields an increase in the labor earnings 
available to low-income families of between $63.413 million and $94.256 million 
(column 9).  
Columns 10, 11, and 12 of Table 2.3 present the estimated change in NY State 
EITC benefits paid. With an increase in the EITC supplement rate, benefit payments 
increase to both those in the labor force and not in the labor force. For those in the 
labor force, the increase in EITC benefits due to the expansion of the credit rate offsets 
the decline in hours worked. Again taking the example of a 45 percent NYS EITC 
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supplement, payments to those in the labor force increase by between $238.900 
million with the low estimate and $260.294 million with the high estimate. For those 
not in the labor force increasing the NYS EITC supplement to 45 percent results in an 
increase in benefits of between $8.638 million and $33.307 million. This results in a 
net increase in NYS EITC expenditures (benefits received) of between $247.538 
million and $293.601 million.  
Table 2.4 presents the simulated effect of an EITC expansion on hours worked, 
labor earnings, combined NYS and federal EITC benefits, and alternative family 
income separately for the average person initially in the labor force and not initially in 
the labor force. With an expansion to a 45 percent NYS EITC supplement the average 
person in the labor force decreases their hours worked by between 0.53 and 5.6 hours 
per year (column 3), while the hours worked of those not initially in the labor force 
increases by the assumed 1633 hours (column 6). As a result, the average labor 
earnings of those initially in the labor force decline by between $19 and $147 (column 
3), while average labor earnings of those initially in the labor force decline by the 
assumed $11,676 (column 6).  
For those initially in the labor force, the decline in labor earnings is more than 
offset by increased federal and state EITC benefit payments, which range from an 
additional $240 to $347 (column 3). The net effect on family income is shown in the 
average alternative family income rows, which indicate that average family income 
changes by between $228 and $214 relative to its pre-EITC expansion value of 
$27,399.  
For those not initially in the labor force, they are assumed to go from $0 in 
state and federal EITC benefits to the combined maximum benefit at a 45 percent state 
supplement rate, which averaged between women with one child and two or more 
children yields $5,035 (column 6). Adding the assumed annual labor earnings and the 
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assumed EITC benefit together yields an income of $16,711. However, as most single 
mothers not initially in the labor force report some family income, the average value 
of family income for single mothers not initially in the labor force of $8,599 is 
subtracted from the $16,711 they are assumed to earn in the labor force in order to get 
a change in family income of $8,112. 
Table 2.5 presents the simulated effect of an EITC expansion on poverty by 
combining the low, medium, and high estimated change in poverty for those initially 
in the labor force with the low, medium, and high estimated change in poverty for 
those not initially in the labor force who enter the labor force. Table 2.5 also presents 
the estimated change in poverty without any behavioral assumptions.  
As a result of increased labor force participation and increased EITC benefit 
receipt, the expansion of the NYS EITC has a significant effect on the number of 
persons in poverty. With an expansion of the credit to 45 percent, poverty is decreased 
by approximately 33,000 persons (adults and children) among those in the labor force, 
and approximately 35,000 persons among those who enter the labor force under the 
low estimate (column 4). Under the medium estimates, poverty is decreased by 
approximately 38,000 persons among those in the labor force, and by approximately 
49,000 persons among those who enter that labor force (column 7). Under the high 
estimates, poverty is decreased by approximately 39,000 persons among those in the 
labor force, and by approximately 59,000 persons among those who enter that labor 
force (column 10). Thus total poverty is estimated to fall by between 68,000 and 
98,000 persons with a 45 percent increase in the NYS EITC supplement rate. 
With an expansion of the NYS EITC credit to 45 percent, the total poverty rate 
declines from the current 11.75 percent to 11.39 percent under the low parameters 
(column 5), 11.29 percent under the medium parameters (column 8), and 11.23 
percent under the high parameters (column 11). As the effect on poverty rates for 
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those in the labor force varies little by low, medium, or high estimate, the child 
poverty rates are only presented for the medium estimate. With an expansion of the 
NYS EITC from 30 percent to 45 percent it is estimated that the child poverty rate 
would decline from the current 15.07 percent to 14.01 percent (column 14).  
Table 2.5 also presents poverty rates using a model with no behavioral effects. 
The model without behavioral effects understates the reduction in poverty relative to 
even the low estimate using behavioral effects. Moreover, it completely misses the 
even greater reductions in poverty for those who enter the labor force. With an 
expansion of the NYS EITC from 30 percent to 45 percent, and assuming no 
behavioral effects, the total number of people in poverty is estimated to fall by 30,000 
(column 1), or from the current poverty rate of 11.75 percent to a poverty rate of 11.55 
percent (column 2), for a reduction of 0.20 percentage points (column 3). For the 
medium estimates of behavioral change, the number of people in poverty is reduced 
by 49,000 from those who enter the labor force and by 38,000 for those who were 
initially in the labor force for a total of 86,000 (column 7). Thus, overall poverty 
reduction is underestimated by approximately 56,000 when behavioral changes are not 
considered.  
Table 2.6 presents side by side comparisons of the results using the medium 
parameters for behavioral effects and results omitting behavioral effects for all 
outcomes of interest. In terms, of employment, hours worked, and labor earnings the 
model with no behavioral effects estimates no change in these outcomes by definition. 
In contrast, the simulation results using the medium parameters for behavioral effects 
estimates an increase in employment of 14,244 persons, a net increase in hours worked 
of 19.393 million, and a net increase in labor earnings of $95.815 million.  
With regards to program expenditures, Table 2.6 shows that omitting 
behavioral effects, an increase in the NYS EITC Supplement rate from 30 to 45 
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percent will result in additional program expenditures, or benefits paid, of $235.513 
million. Based on the medium estimates, this is $9.879 million less than the estimated 
benefits paid to those in the labor market at the time of the EITC change using the 
behavioral model, and misses completely the $19.787 million in estimated additional 
benefits paid to the new labor market entrants. Thus, the model without behavioral 
effects understates the increased costs of expanding the EITC program by a total of 
$29.666 million. 
In the model with no behavioral effects, the only change in family income 
occurs through the change in the amount of the state EITC benefit received. However, 
in the behavioral model labor supply, and the values of labor earnings, state taxes, and 
federal taxes/EITC benefit are allowed to vary in addition to the state EITC benefit. 
Using the medium behavioral effects, the family incomes of those initially in the labor 
force are estimated to increase by $226.276 million, while the family incomes of those 
not initially in the labor force are estimated to increase by $93.757 million for a total 
increase in family income of $320.033 million (column 1).17 Without behavioral 
effects, the family incomes of those initially in the labor force increases by the 
$235.513 million increase in the state EITC supplement (column 2). There is no 
increase in the family incomes of those not initially in the labor force. On net, the 
model with no behavioral effects understates the change in family income resulting 
from an expansion of the NYS EITC by $84.520 million.  
                                                 
17 Based on the assumptions specified for persons not in the labor force who enter the labor force in 
response to the EITC increase a single mother with one child would have a family income of $13,912 
and a single mother with two children would have a family income of $16,378 with an expansion of the 
NYS EITC to 45 percent. With an expansion of the NYS EITC to 45 percent of the federal credit, 7,017 
single mothers with one child, and 7,227 single mothers with two children would enter the labor force. 
Based on the CPS, the average family income in the CPS of a single mother with one child not in the 
labor force is $8,047 and the average family income of a single mother with two children is $9,124. 
Taking the difference between average incomes in and out of the labor force and multiplying these 
values by the respective number of people who enter the labor force yields an aggregate increase in 
family income of $93.757 million. 
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2.7. Conclusions 
Using a variety of parameters drawn from the labor supply and EITC literature, this 
paper provides low, medium, and high estimates of the effect of expanding the NYS 
EITC on employment, hours worked, income, poverty, and the cost of the program. It 
then compares these estimates with those obtained from a model of the effect of 
expanding the NYS EITC that omits behavioral effects. Overall, an expansion of the 
NYS EITC from 30 to 45 percent of the federal credit is estimated to increase 
employment by between 7,125 and 21,363 single mothers. Hours worked are 
estimated to decline by between 563,000 hours per year and 5.951 million hours per 
year for those in the labor force at the time of the expansion, and increase by between 
11.635 million and 34.886 million hours for those not in the labor force at the time of 
the expansion. Therefore, on net, hours worked by New York State residents would 
increase by between 11.071 million and 28.935 million hours.  
Total labor earnings for those in the labor force at the time of the expansion of 
the credit to 45 percent are estimated to decline by between $19.775 million and 
$155.180 million, or an average $45 to $147 per person. But these lost earnings are 
more than made up by the increased earnings of those who enter the labor force in 
response to the EITC expansion. On net, labor earnings are estimated to increase by 
between $63.413 million and $94.256 million.  
The lower labor earnings of those in the labor force at the time of the EITC 
expansion are offset by their increased EITC benefit, so that average family income is 
increased across all specifications when compared to the current 30 percent state 
supplement. With an expansion to a 45 percent state supplement, average federal and 
state EITC benefits are estimated to increase by between $116 and $347. Combining 
the change in total EITC benefits with the decrease in labor earnings and other 
 90 
changes in family income, results in an average increase in family income of between 
$75 and $214.  
Those who enter the labor force in response to the EITC expansion receive 
between $8.638 million and $33.307 million in EITC benefits in addition to their labor 
earnings of between $83.187 million and $249.436 million. On net, this results in 
additional benefit payments/costs to New York State of between $247.538 million and 
$293.601 million.  
As a result of the additional labor earnings and EITC benefits, total poverty 
determined using alternative family income declines from 11.75 percent to between 
11.39 percent and 11.23 percent, or by between 68,000 and 98,000 persons, once labor 
force entrants are included. Moreover, child poverty declines from 15.07 percent to 
approximately 14.01 percent, as 48,000 children are lifted out of poverty.  
These results clearly demonstrate that expanding state EITC supplements will 
significantly increase the labor force participation of single mothers, the total income 
of low-income families, and reduce their risk of poverty. The labor supply incentives 
created by the EITC program will move people not currently in the labor force into the 
labor force. And it will move workers currently in the phase-in region to work more. 
This will increase their income via both greater labor earnings and higher EITC 
payments. Hence each additional dollar of EITC benefits to these families will mean 
more than a dollar of additional income. Since these are predominantly poor families 
to begin with, the EITC program has its greatest impact on poor families.  
This paper further demonstrates the importance of including behavioral effects 
in estimating the impact of EITC program changes. Using the medium estimates, an 
increase in the NYS EITC Supplement from 30 to 45 percent will induce 14,244 more 
people into the labor force. While it will decrease the hours of work of those in the 
labor force at the time of enactment by 3.867 million hours, this will be offset by the 
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23.260 million hours of work by new entrants. Likewise, ignoring behavioral effects 
will miss the decline of $70.497 million in the earnings of those in the labor market at 
the time of enactment, but also the more than offsetting $166.312 million increase in 
the earnings of new labor market entrants. 
Behavioral effects also impact the estimated cost of the EITC program. The 
14,244 people who were not in the labor force prior to the enactment of the EITC will 
now be counted as receiving EITC benefits. But benefits will also rise on average for 
those who were employed because those in the phase-in region will work more and 
those in the phase-out region will work less.  
Taken together, these differences between models with and without behavioral 
effects suggest that cost-benefit analyses of expanding the EITC program made based 
on estimates from models without behavioral effects would understate both the costs 
and benefits of the expansion. Moreover, estimates of the effect of current EITC 
programs on income and poverty which omit labor supply responses to the program—
such as the Census Bureaus Alternative Poverty Estimates— fail to capture the 
complete impact of the EITC.  
This study demonstrates why policy research on the effect of the EITC on 
income understates both the costs and benefits of EITC expansion when it simply adds 
the increased value of EITC benefits to existing income. Doing so ignores the fact that 
the major labor supply response to the EITC is for persons not in the labor force to 
enter the labor market, and that those currently in the labor market will seek to 
maximize their EITC benefit, which will disproportionately reduce poverty, as most 
persons below poverty will be induced to increase their labor earnings.  
The extension of the existing simulation framework to state EITC programs 
and more rigorous analysis of outcomes for those not in the labor force is an 
innovation to the academic literature. Previous simulations have focused primarily on 
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the effect of an EITC expansion on those currently in the labor force, which, as this 
paper demonstrates, represents only a fraction of the total effect of the EITC. The use 
of estimates of the elasticity of labor force participation to net income from previous 
studies of the EITC to simulate changes in employment is a straightforward yet 
powerful addition to the existing framework. Moreover, extending the outcomes 
examined to income, poverty, and costs to the state, which were omitted from previous 
studies, expands the policy relevance of this literature.  
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CHAPTER THREE: 
THE IMPACT OF FATNESS ON DISABILITY INSURANCE APPLICATION 
BY THE NON-ELDERLY* 
Abstract 
The most commonly used measures of fatness in social science research are body mass 
index (BMI) and obesity, defined as a BMI greater than or equal to 30. The use of 
BMI is based on the widespread availability of information on height and weight in 
social science datasets, rather than the medical accuracy of BMI. In fact, BMI is 
limited as a predictor of health outcomes by its inability to distinguish fat from 
muscle. Using Social Security Administration (SSA) administrative records recently 
linked to National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey (NHANES) III data we 
determine the value of using more accurate measures of fatness than body mass index 
to predict an important economic and policy outcome: application for Social Security 
Disability Insurance (DI). These data provide more accurate outcome and predictor 
variables than were available in previous research into the association between fatness 
and disability. Our results indicate that despite the limitations of BMI, it is 
consistently a significant predictor of future application for DI; though more accurate 
measures of fatness occasionally perform better as predictors of application. As the 
measure of fatness that is most predictive of a given outcome appears to vary by the 
outcome examined, we urge the collection of alternative measures of fatness in social 
science datasets. We also encourage researchers examining the impact of fatness on 
social science outcomes of interest to use several measures of fatness where possible. 
 
JEL Code: I10 
                                                 
* Maximilian Schmeiser, Department of Policy Analysis and Management, Cornell University, Ithaca 
NY 14853; Richard V. Burkhauser, Department of Policy Analysis and Management, Cornell 
University, Ithaca NY 14853; John Cawley, Department of Policy Analysis and Management, Cornell 
University, Ithaca NY 14853. 
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3.1. Introduction 
Fatness is most commonly measured in the social science literature using body mass 
index (BMI)—weight in kilograms divided by height in meters squared (U.S. DHHS, 
2001; NIH, 1998). BMI’s main advantage is that the information needed to calculate it 
is easy to collect and common in social science datasets. Despite its widespread use, 
many medical researchers argue that BMI fails to distinguish important physical 
differences between people with identical BMI levels. In particular, BMI does not 
distinguish between fat and muscle. They further argue that direct measures of fatness 
(such as total body fat (TBF) or percent body fat (PBF)) are more accurate (Prentice 
and Jebb, 2001; Gallagher et al., 1996).  
Obesity is a concept that refers to excessive fatness (Bjorntorp, 2002; Bray, 
Bouchard, and James, 1998). Each of the many measures of obesity has strengths and 
weaknesses that depend on the measure of fatness on which it is based. For the reasons 
discussed above, the most common definition of obesity in the social science literature 
is based on BMI: a BMI greater than or equal to 30.  
Obesity may increase the risk of disability (Burkhauser and Cawley, 2005; 
Lakdawalla, Bhattacharya, and Goldman, 2004; Ferraro et al., 2002; Narbro et al., 
1996). However, these studies use BMI (constructed using self-reports of weight and 
height) as a measure of fatness, and have not tested whether more accurate measures 
of fatness (such as TBF and PBF) are predictors of these outcomes. This paper 
evaluates which measure or measures of fatness (specifically, TBF, PBF, BMI, waist 
circumference, waist-to-hip ratio, or obesity status based on each of these measures of 
fatness) most accurately predict application for Social Security Disability Insurance 
(DI) benefits.  
Eligibility for DI depends on a determination that the applicant’s disability 
meets or exceeds the medical listing, conditional on attaining the necessary number of 
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covered quarters of employment.1 Hence we will focus on the decision to apply for 
benefits, because application and not acceptance is entirely the decision of the 
individual. We focus on the working age population (ages 21 to 48) for several 
reasons. We restrict the sample to persons no more than 48 years of age, as we need to 
observe respondents who are potentially eligible for the DI program for the full 10 
years covered by our sample. Moreover, we want to avoid observing older applicants 
who face the more complicated decision of whether to apply for DI, or take early Old-
Age (OA) retirement benefits or other Social Security benefits. We restrict the sample 
to persons at who are initially at least 21 years of age, as this age group is likely to 
have achieved the necessary covered quarters of employment for DI eligibility within 
our 10 year sample period. 
Existing research (Burkhauser and Cawley, 2008) shows that how a researcher 
defines obesity can have significant implications for research. In particular, racial 
disparities in the prevalence of obesity are dramatically altered by using a more 
accurate measure of fatness such as Percent Body Fat rather than BMI to define 
obesity. This research also indicates that the correlation of fatness with employment 
status differs significantly by the measure of fatness used; for example, decomposing 
body mass into Total Body Fat and Fat-Free Mass reveals that only Total Body Fat, 
and never Fat-Free Mass, is correlated with the likelihood of employment. This 
important difference in body composition is obscured by the use of BMI as a measure 
of fatness. This paper examines which of the many measures of fatness available in the 
NHANES III data are most predictive of application for DI benefits, and more 
generally, are useful for predicting social science outcomes. 
                                                 
1 To be eligible to receive DI benefits a claimant must have worked in employment covered by the 
Social Security Program for at least 20 of the previous 40 quarters. Claimants under the age of 31 can 
qualify for DI benefits by having worked in covered employment in at least half of the quarters that 
elapsed since the age of 21, with a minimum of 6 covered quarters. Blind claimants under the age of 24 
can qualify for DI benefits by having worked in covered employment in at least 6 of the previous 12 
quarters (SSA, 2007, Table 2.A7). 
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3.2. Fatness and Disability Insurance (DI) 
To be eligible for DI disability benefits, applicants must, among other things, have 
medical conditions that meet or exceed the official Listings of Impairments. (See Daly 
and Burkhauser, 2003 for a discussion of their changing eligibility criteria.) While 
obesity is no longer a named condition in these listings, several of the medical 
conditions in the listing are correlated with obesity.  
During roughly the same time that the prevalence of obesity (defined using 
BMI) doubled in the U.S., the employment rate of working-age persons with 
disabilities fell by 28.4 percent for men and 13.8 percent for women (Stapleton and 
Burkhauser, 2003). Moreover, the number of beneficiaries receiving income from DI 
doubled from 3.8 million in 1983 to 7.6 million in 2002 (Social Security 
Administration, 2004). These simultaneous trends have raised concerns that obesity 
increases disability-related exits from the labor force. Studies using micro data find 
that obesity (defined by BMI) is correlated with exit from the work force and with 
increases in DI rolls (Lakdawalla, Bhattacharya, and Goldman, 2004; Ferraro et al., 
2002; Narbro et al., 1996). A substantial literature in economics models the decision 
of workers to apply for DI following the onset of a disability. (See Bound and 
Burkhauser, 1999 for a review of the literature and Burkhauser, Butler and Gumus, 
2004 for a structural modeling example in this literature.) But data limitations have 
required the vast majority of these studies to use subjective measures of health such as 
self-rated work limitations or self-rated health as the measure of disability. In the rare 
instance when information on fatness was available, it was in the form of self-reported 
weight (utilized in conjunction with self-reported height, e.g. as BMI).  
This paper substantially contributes to the literature on the impact of obesity on 
the decision to exit the labor market via DI. It makes use of social security records, as 
opposed to self-reports of disability or receipt of DI benefits, and it examines which of 
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the numerous measures of fatness available in the NHANES III is most predictive of 
application for DI. 
3.3. Background on More Accurate Measures of Fatness 
While there is consensus in the medical literature that BMI is a poor measure of 
fatness (McCarthy et al., 2006; Yusuf et al., 2005; Gallagher et al., 1996; Smalley et 
al., 1990; Garn et al., 1986), there is no consensus on which of the more accurate 
measures of fatness is best (Freedman and Perry, 2000). Candidates include: total 
body fat (TBF), fat free mass (FFM—which is total body mass minus total body fat), 
percent body fat (PBF—which is total body fat divided by total mass), waist 
circumference (WC), and waist-to-hip ratio (WHR).  
TBF and PBF are appealing measures of fatness because the medical literature 
suggests that fat is a risk factor for morbidity and mortality (Pi-Sunyer, 2002; U.S. 
DHHS, 2001). For example, Trayhurn and Beattie (2001) argue that fat directly causes 
Type II diabetes and cardiovascular disease by secreting resistin and leptin; these 
findings suggest that TBF may be the most relevant measure of fatness for predicting 
social science outcomes affected by health because the sheer volume of fat may 
determine the amount of leptin and resistin released; alternatively PBF may be a better 
measure if additional fat-free-mass can dilute the health impacts of those secretions. 
There are a variety of ways of measuring TBF and therefore PBF, which range 
from methods that use very expensive equipment that can be used only in a lab setting 
and which require subject cooperation or exposure to radiation (e.g. magnetic 
resonance imaging or MRI, dual x-ray absorptiometry or DXA) to more portable 
(field-based) methods that are less expensive and rapid such as Bioelectrical 
Impedance Analysis or BIA (Freedman and Perry 2000). Each method of measuring 
body composition has its pros and cons (Freedman and Perry 2000); for example, the 
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BIA method of estimating fat-free mass is less accurate for the severely obese (NIH, 
1996). However, despite this limitation, the NIH endorses BIA as a useful technique 
for measuring body fat and body composition generally (NIH 1996). In addition, BIA 
is arguably the best method to assess fatness for large-scale surveys; Prentice and Jebb 
(2001) conclude: “Bioimpedance is probably the only technique that can meet the 
criteria of being simple, rapid, and free from operator variability” (page 146). 
However, it is not our position that BIA is unambiguously preferable to every other 
method of measuring body fat; we use it because it is one method endorsed by the 
NIH (NIH, 1996) and it is the only method for which data is now available in a large, 
nationally representative U.S. dataset—the NHANES. 
Researchers can utilize the full variation in PBF, or they can convert it into an 
indicator variable for obesity. The NIH classifies a man as obese if his PBF exceeds 
25 percent and a woman as obese if her PBF exceeds 30 percent (NIDDK, 2006).  
Findings from the medical literature also suggest that it is not just the amount 
of fat that matters, but also the location or distribution of that fat. In particular, 
abdominal visceral fat (i.e. that located around the internal organs) is associated with 
an elevated risk of morbidity (Bray, Bouchard, and James, 1998). The amount of 
abdominal visceral fat can be assessed using laboratory methods, but in practice it is 
frequently measured using either waist circumference or waist-to-hip ratio; 
comparisons have found that these two are highly correlated with abdominal fat 
(Snijder et al., 2002).  
While it is generally accepted that central adiposity (abdominal fat) is 
associated with greater risk of morbidity and mortality, it is not clear that waist-to-hip 
ratio is the best way to measure it. For example, a 1998 NIH report recommends the 
use of waist circumference rather than waist-to-hip ratio to measure central adiposity 
(NIH, 1998, p. xxiv). One can use estimated waist circumference in isolation as a 
102 
measure of fatness in social science datasets, or in combination with BMI. The NIH 
classifies individuals at “high risk” if waist circumference exceeds 102 cm (40 inches) 
for men or exceeds 88 cm (35 inches) for women (NIH, 1998, p. xv). For waist-to-hip 
ratios, Han et al. (1995) find an increased prevalence of cardiovascular risk factors if 
waist-to-hip ratio is greater than or equal to 0.95 for men, or is greater than or equal to 
0.80 for women. Hence we also look at waist-to-hip ratios and waist circumference, as 
well as indicators for being at “high risk” based on the respective measure of central 
adiposity.  
Despite the skepticism in the medical literature toward BMI as a measure of 
either fatness or obesity, virtually no tests of the robustness of social science-based 
findings using these more accurate measures of fatness have been undertaken on social 
science-based outcomes. This paper fills that void 
3.4. Multiple Measures of BMI 
The inclusion of both measured weight and height, and self-reported weight and height 
in the NHANES III allows for the calculation of BMI values and corresponding 
indicators for obesity from measured and self-reported values. Though BMI based on 
measured weight and height is more accurate than BMI based on self-reported weight 
and height, we also examine self-reported BMI due to its greater availability in social 
science data sets.  
Previous research by Cawley and Burkhauser (2006) using the NHANES III 
identified systematic differences between self-reported weight and height and 
measured weight and height by race and gender. In order to allow researchers using 
data sets which include only self-reported values to adjust for the self-report bias in 
weight and height, they provide regression coefficients by sex and race, which can be 
applied to self-reported weight and height, and age to predict measured weight and 
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height. Given that the convention in economic literature examining BMI is to use 
these adjustment factors, we also examine adjusted BMI and the corresponding 
indicator for obesity. 
3.5. Data 
We estimate our models using the 2006 version of the restricted access National 
Health and Nutrition Examination Survey (NHANES) III linked Master Beneficiary 
Record and Mortality files. The NHANES III is a nationally representative cross-
sectional survey conducted from 1988 to 1994. All respondents were asked to 
complete an extensive interview (during which they were asked to report their weight 
and height) and undergo a subsequent medical examination in a large mobile 
examination center (during which their weight and height were measured). The 
NHANES III sample consists of 31,311 examined respondents.  
The NHANES III is the “Rosetta Stone” for estimating more accurate 
measures of fatness, because it is the only large, nationally-representative survey in 
the United States that includes the data necessary to calculate many measures of 
fatness. It includes: Bioelectrical Impedance Analysis readings that can be used to 
calculate fat-free mass and therefore Total Body Fat and Percent Body Fat, skinfold 
thicknesses that can be used to calculate percent body fat, measured weight and height, 
self-reported weight and height, measured waist circumference, and measured waist-
to-hip ratio. Furthermore, in 2006, DI administrative records data through December 
2003 were linked to NHANES III. 
The NHANES III linked Social Security Administration (SSA) Master 
Beneficiary Record (MBR) file contains Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability 
Insurance (OASDI) eligibility and benefit information on all NHANES III respondents 
who could be linked to their Social Security records, and applied for OASDI program 
104 
benefits from 1962 through 2003. The SSA linked NHANES III respondents to their 
Social Security records using their Social Security Number, name, data of birth, sex, 
state of birth, and zip code (NCHS, 2006, p. 6). The SSA was able to link over 90 
percent of NHANES III respondents to their Social Security records (NCHS, 2006, p. 
9).2  
Unfortunately, the MBR file contains Social Security eligibility information 
only for those persons who apply for Social Security benefits between 1962 and 2003. 
It does not contain information on the majority of NHANES respondents who do not 
file some type of social security claim over the sample period. As we do not have 
social security records for all persons in the sample, we are unable to identify those 
persons who have met the covered quarters requirement for DI, but do not apply for 
DI benefits. That is to say, we are unable to separate the entire sample into those who 
are insured by the DI program and those who are not insured by the DI program. We 
must therefore included uninsured persons in our estimation sample.  
However, this limitation serves only to bias our results towards zero, 
suggesting that our estimates represent a lower-bound on the effect of fatness on DI 
application. We are also limited to examining application for DI within 10 years of the 
medical examination, as we have at most 10 years of data for respondents examined in 
1994. As the MBR file contains only detailed information on the most recent 
application for DI, we are limited to examining the most recent application for DI 
benefits, rather than the entire history of DI application. We also lack the Social 
Security Earnings Records, which would provide more detailed information on all 
NHANES III respondents over the entire sample period.  
                                                 
2 The primary reason an NHANES III respondent could not be linked to their Social Security record 
was refusal by the NHANES III respondent to provide their Social Security Number. Missing data on 
last name and date of birth also resulted in linkage failures (NCHS, 2006, p. 6). 
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In addition to the linkage of the NHANES III to Social Security records by the 
SSA, the National Center for Health Statistics (NCHS) linked the NHANES III to 
death certificate information found in the National Death Index (NDI) from 1988 
through 2000. The use of the NHANES III linked Mortality file allows for the 
exclusion of respondents who died during the sample period.  
We estimate models of application for DI using all NHANES III respondents 
who were between ages 21 and 48 at the time of their examination, are linked to the 
administrative records, who were not already recipients of DI benefits, and who did 
not die within the 5 or 10 year window following their examination. Mexican 
Americans are also excluded from the sample, because the sample used to generate the 
BIA conversion equations excluded Hispanics. After these sample restrictions, we 
have complete data on 2,109 men and 2,412 women for 5 years post-examination, and 
2,073 men and 2,387 women for 10 years post-examination. 
Table 3.1 presents descriptive statistics for the sample, by gender and 
application period. As there are few differences between the 5 and 10 years samples 
only the descriptive statistics for the 5 years sample are discussed here. For men in the 
5 year sample, the average age at the time of their medical exam was 414.7 months 
(34.56 years). For women in the 5 year sample, the average age at the time of their 
medical exam was 415.2 months (34.60 years). For men, a high school diploma was 
the highest educational attainment of 36.9 percent of the sample, while 44.0 percent 
had education beyond high school. For women, 41.0 percent had a high school 
diploma, while 42.1 percent had education beyond high school. For men, 55.4 percent 
were married, 6.5 percent were divorced, and 2.8 percent were separated. For women, 
51.3 percent were married, 12.2 percent were divorced, and 5.4 percent were 
separated. 51.4 percent of men in the 5 year sample were non-Hispanic white, and 
48.6 percent were non-Hispanic black. For women, 50.8 percent of the 5 year sample 
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was non-Hispanic white, and 49.2 percent was non-Hispanic black. The modal family 
income category was $10,000 to $19,999, with the median respondent having a family 
income of $20,000 to $29,999, for both men and women. 
Using the BIA method of measuring body fat, the average male in the 5 year 
sample had 63.5 kg of fat free mass and 19.6 kg of body fat, while the average female 
had 46.0 kg of fat free mass and 26.1 kg of body fat. For the average male this 
translates into a PBF of approximately 22.7. For the average female this translates to a 
PBF of approximately 34.5. The PBF calculated using skinfold thicknesses was 
considerably lower at 13.7 for males and 29.2 for females. The average PFFM from 
BIA was 77.3 for men, and 65.5 for women. 
Using measured height and weight, the average male in the 5 year sample had 
a BMI of 26.4, while the average female had a BMI of 26.9. There were minimal 
differences between the average BMI values calculated using either measured height 
and weight, self-reported height and weight, or adjusted self-reported height and 
weight. 
The average male in the 5 year sample had a waist circumference of 92.2 cm, 
while the average female had a waist circumference of 87.7 cm. When waist 
circumference is dichotomized into an indicator for excessive fatness, 19.8 percent of 
males and 41.6 percent of females are classified as “high risk” (WC>102 cm for men, 
WC>88 cm for women).  
The waist-to-hip ratio of the average male in the 5 year sample was 0.922, and 
0.844 for the average female. Dichotomizing waist-to-hip ratio into an indicator for 
excessive fatness, 29.9 percent of males and 72.4 percent of females are classified as 
“high risk” (WHR≥ 0.95 for men, WHR≥ 0.85 cm for women). 
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Table 3.1. Descriptive statistics for Sample 
 Mean (Standard deviation) 
 Men  Women 
Application for DI  
within:  
Application for DI  
within: 
Variables: 5 years 10 years  5 years 10 years 
Age in Months at Exam 414.737 413.450  415.227 414.738 
 (92.455) (92.163)  (89.732) (89.687) 
High School 0.369 0.368  0.410 0.410 
 (0.483) (0.482)  (0.492) (0.492) 
Greater than High School 0.440 0.445  0.421 0.422 
 (0.497) (0.497)  (0.494) (0.494) 
Married 0.554 0.555  0.513 0.516 
 (0.497) (0.497)  (0.500) (0.500) 
Divorced 0.065 0.066  0.122 0.120 
 (0.247) (0.248)  (0.328) (0.325) 
Separated 0.028 0.027  0.054 0.054 
 (0.166) (0.162)  (0.226) (0.227) 
White 0.514 0.517  0.508 0.509 
 (0.500) (0.500)  (0.500) (0.500) 
Black 0.486 0.483  0.492 0.491 
 (0.500) (0.500)  (0.500) (0.500) 
Family Income from $0 to $9,999 0.115 0.110  0.158 0.156 
 (0.319) (0.313)  (0.364) (0.363) 
Family Income from $10,000 to 
$19,999 0.230 0.231  0.223 0.222 
 (0.421) (0.422)  (0.416) (0.416) 
Family Income from $20,000 to 
$29,999 0.174 0.175  0.170 0.170 
 (0.380) (0.380)  (0.376) (0.376) 
Family Income from $30,000 to 
$39,999 0.163 0.164  0.138 0.138 
 (0.370) (0.371)  (0.345) (0.345) 
Family Income from $40,000 to 
$49,999 0.125 0.123  0.121 0.122 
 (0.330) (0.329)  (0.327) (0.328) 
Family Income >$50,000 0.193 0.196  0.190 0.191 
 (0.395) (0.397)  (0.393) (0.394) 
Fat Free Mass 63.518 63.492  46.049 45.995 
 (10.285) (10.263)  (7.374) (7.353) 
Total Body Fat 19.608 19.600  26.083 26.010 
 (9.456) (9.397)  (12.415) (12.395) 
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Table 3.1. (Continued) 
 Mean (Standard deviation) 
 Men  Women 
Application for DI  
within:  
Application for DI  
within: 
Variables: 5 years 10 years  5 years 10 years 
Percent Body Fat (PBF) 22.686 22.699  34.467 34.430 
 (6.697) (6.649)  (8.011) (8.012) 
Percent Body Fat (Skinfold) 13.726 13.691  29.189 29.122 
 (11.199) (11.146)  (14.814) (14.811) 
Percent Fat Free Mass 77.314 77.301  65.533 65.570 
 (6.697) (6.649)  (8.011) (8.012) 
Body Mass Index (Measured) 26.369 26.359  26.873 26.834 
 (5.078) (5.050)  (6.820) (6.808) 
Body Mass Index (Self-reported) 26.222 26.205  26.244 26.200 
 (4.499) (4.476)  (6.167) (6.149) 
Body Mass Index (Self-reported, 
Adjusted) 26.284 26.265  26.935 26.887 
 (4.838) (4.813)  (6.491) (6.471) 
Waist Circumference (WC) 92.175 92.126  87.681 87.565 
 (13.725) (13.656)  (15.847) (15.811) 
Waist-to-Hip Ratio (WHR) 0.922 0.921  0.844 0.843 
 (0.068) (0.068)  (0.077) (0.077) 
Obese PBF 0.369 0.370  0.702 0.700 
 (0.483) (0.483)  (0.458) (0.458) 
Obese Skinfold 0.164 0.162  0.523 0.521 
 (0.370) (0.368)  (0.500) (0.500) 
Obese BMI Measured 0.189 0.187  0.269 0.267 
 (0.391) (0.390)  (0.444) (0.442) 
Obese BMI Self-reported 0.156 0.154  0.224 0.221 
 (0.363) (0.361)  (0.417) (0.415) 
Obese BMI Self-reported, 
Adjusted 0.169 0.168  0.261 0.258 
 (0.375) (0.374)  (0.439) (0.437) 
High Risk WC 0.198 0.196  0.416 0.413 
 (0.398) (0.397)  (0.493) (0.492) 
High Risk WHR 0.299 0.298  0.724 0.721 
 (0.458) (0.457)  (0.447) (0.448) 
Applied for DI 0.033 0.071  0.029 0.067 
 (0.178) (0.257)  (0.168) (0.251) 
Sample Size 2109 2073  2412 2387 
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Based on PBF from BIA, 36.9 percent of men in the 5 year sample were 
classified as obese, while 70.2 percent of women were classified as obese (PBF>25 for 
men, PBF>30 for women). Based on measured BMI, 18.9 percent of men in the 5 year 
sample were classified as obese, while 26.9 percent of women were classified as obese 
(BMI ≥ 30). The much lower prevalence of obesity when calculated using BMI 
relative to PBF is consistent with the results of Burkhauser and Cawley (2008). 
3.6. Method of Calculating Total Body Fat (TBF) and Percent Body Fat (PBF) 
We calculate TBF and PBF using BIA measurements contained in the NHANES III. 
There are multiple systems used to collect BIA data, which generate output in 
different scales; however, the output is easily converted between scales. In NHANES 
III, BIA resistance is measured using a Valhalla system, while in the study that 
produced the prediction equations (Sun et al., 2003), resistance is measured using an 
RJL system. In order to use the Sun et al. (2003) prediction equations, we first convert 
the Valhalla BIA resistance value for each NHANES III respondent to the equivalent 
RJL resistance value using the formulas contained in the appendix to Chumlea et al. 
(2002): 
For males: 
RJL resistance = 2.5 + 0.98 Val resistance  
For females: 
RJL resistance = 9.6 + 0.96 Val resistance  
Chumlea et al. (2002) report that the R-squared was .996 for men and .993 for women. 
Sun et al. (2003) use data from five research centers to establish the equations 
to predict fat-free mass using BIA resistance measurements. TBF was determined 
using measurements of total body water, bone mineral content, and body density. Fat-
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free mass (FFM) was calculated as weight minus TBF. They find the following 
equations had the best fit:  
For males:  
2StatureFat-free mass = -10.678 + 0.262 weight + 0.652  + 0.015 Resistance 
Resistance
 
For females: 
2StatureFat-free mass = -9.529 + 0.168 weight + 0.696  + 0.016 Resistance 
Resistance
 
Weight was measured in kilograms and stature (height) in centimeters. These formulas 
for calculating fat and fat-free mass do not control for age because when Sun et al. 
(2003) tested whether age should be included, they found it did not significantly 
improve the fit of their model. The same formula is used for African Americans and 
whites because Sun et al. (2003) found no significant differences in goodness of fit of 
their model whether they pooled whites and African Americans or used whites alone; 
for this reason, they report only equations derived from whites and African Americans 
pooled. However, Sun et al. (2003) note that the final FFM equations (which do not 
control for race) tend to underpredict African American males’ FFM by 2.1 kg and 
African American females’ FFM by 1.6 kg, and to overpredict white males’ FFM by 
0.4 kg and white females’ FFM by 0.3 kg. (No Hispanics were in the sample.) We 
adjust the FFM of NHANES respondents by these amounts. The R-squared of the 
prediction equation was .90 for men and .83 for women.  
BIA predicts FFM, but TBF is easily determined using the same identity below 
for men and women: 
Total body fat = weight – fat-free mass 
and: 
Percent body fat = (Total body fat / weight) * 100 
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The NHANES III also includes measurements of tricep and subscapular 
skinfold thicknesses. These skinfold measures can be converted into percent body fat 
following a two-step process. First, body density is predicted using tricep and 
subscapular skinfold thicknesses based on the age and gender specific formulas 
provided in Durnin and Womersley (1974). Second, percent body fat was computed 
using body density using the Siri (1956) conversion equation: 
100*50.495.4 ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −=
density
PBF  
The value in examining PBF calculated using skinfolds in addition to PBF 
calculated from BIA is that tricep and subscapular skinfold thicknesses are the only 
measure of fatness consistently collected in the NHANES other than BMI. 
3.7. Models to Estimate the Correlation of Fatness with Application for DI 
Benefits 
Various measures of fatness serve as our key regressors in models in which the 
dependent variable is an indicator for whether the NHANES III respondent applied for 
DI benefits within 5 years or 10 years of their NHANES III physical examination.  
Application for DI is determined using the Master Beneficiary Record File. 
Application for DI benefits within 5 years or 10 years of the physical examination is 
determined in the following manner. First, the sample is restricted to respondents ages 
21 to 48 at the time of their physical examination, and those persons who die within 5 
years or 10 years of their medical exam are dropped from the sample. Next, the date 
on which the remaining respondents most recently filled for DI benefits must have 
been within either 5 years or 10 years after their physical examination. Their 
Beneficiary Identification code (BIC) at their date of current eligibility for benefits 
must have been coded “primary claimant/number holder” and their type of claim 
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(TOC) had to be “disability care where beneficiary is: a) disabled primary not reduced 
for age; b)aged or divorced wife/husband not reduced for age; c) young wife entitled 
for young child-in-care; d) young child” or “disability case where beneficiary is: a) 
disabled primary reduced for age; b) aged or divorced wife/husband reduced for age”.  
We include both applicants who received DI benefits and those who were 
denied DI benefits in our sample. We can identify whether or not an applicant was 
denied benefits, and the reason for that denial, based on the variable Ledger Account 
File (LAF). Reasons for denial include failing to meet the medical listings for 
disability, or having insufficient covered quarters of employment (uninsured). In our 5 
year sample, 3 men and 6 women were denied benefits due to being uninsured, while 
28 men and 19 women were denied benefits due to not meeting the medical listings 
out of a total of 69 applications for men and 70 applications for women. In our 10 year 
sample, 10 men and 21 women were denied benefits due to being uninsured, while 55 
men and 51 women were denied benefits due to not meeting the medical listings out of 
a total of 147 applications for men and 161 applications for women.3  
We assume that individual i applies for DI benefits if his health Hi falls below 
some critical limit H*. Health is assumed to be a function of fatness Fi and other 
characteristics Xi. Specifically: 
Hi= Fi β + Xi δ + ui 
Health H is not observed, but we know whether an individual applies for DI benefits; 
we denote DI_app=1 if individual i applies for DI benefits and DI_app=0 otherwise. 
Formally, applying for DI benefits relates to latent health in the following way: 
DI_app i = 0 if Hi ≥ H* or DI_app i = 1 if Hi < H* 
                                                 
3 Estimates were also obtained for a sample which excluded persons denied coverage on the basis of 
being uninsured. This had no significant effect on the coefficient estimates.  
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Normalizing H* at H=0, the probability that one applies for DI benefits is equal to the 
following. 
(1) i i i i i iPr[DI_app = 1 | F ,X ] = Pr[u < - F - X ]β δ  
With certain assumptions about the distribution of the error term u, one can estimate 
the probability of applying for DI benefits as a function of fatness F and 
characteristics X using probit regression. 
We estimate model (1) for the following measures of fatness: total body fat and 
fat-free mass from BIA, percent body fat from BIA, percent fat-free mass from BIA, 
percent body fat from skinfolds, body mass index from measured weight and height, 
body mass index from self-reported weight and height, body mass index from adjusted 
self-reported weight and height, waist circumference, waist-to-hip ratio, and indicators 
for obesity based on each measure of fatness. Control variables include: age and age 
squared at time of NHANES III examination, race, education category, marital status, 
family income to poverty cut-off ratio, and family income category. Models are 
estimated separately for men and women.  
Our set of control variables includes regressors that may themselves be 
determined by fatness. As such, models are first estimated which include only those 
variables which are completely exogenous: age and race. We subsequently estimate 
models which add education, marital status, and family income to poverty cut-off 
ratio. By excluding variables which are potentially determined by fatness, we measure 
the total correlation of fatness with DI application. By then including these controls, 
we can determine the extent to which the correlation of fatness with DI application 
operates through these variables. Lastly, we estimate models which add family income 
category. Likewise, by excluding income category, we measure the total correlation of 
fatness with DI application, and by then including income category we can determine 
the extent to which the correlation may operate through income. Income may prove to 
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be a relevant pathway because previous research has determined that for white 
females, weight and obesity lower wages (Cawley, 2004). 
We take into account the complex survey design of the NHANES III by 
estimating our models using svy commands in Stata version 10 that account for the 
strata and primary sampling units of the NHANES III. And we use the WTPFEX6 
sample weights, which are recommended when studying medical examination 
variables such as weight and BIA measurements. 
3.8. Results 
We first estimate probit models of application for DI benefits within 5 years or 10 
years of the medical examination, which only control for the exogenous variables age 
at time of NHANES III examination and race.4 These models are estimated for each of 
our measures of fatness, and corresponding indicators for excessive fatness. Table 3.2 
presents results from the probit models for DI application by sex and application time 
period. For application by males within 5 years none of the measures of fatness are 
statistically significant predictors of application for DI. Moreover, the coefficients on 
BMI, BMI (self-reported), WHR, obese (BMI), obese (BMI self-reported)), high-risk 
WC, and high-risk WHR have the expected signs. The coefficients on TBF, FFM, 
PBF (BIA), PBF (skinfold), PFFM, BMI (self-reported, adjusted), WC, obese PBF 
(BIA), and obese PBF (skinfold) have the opposite sign from what was expected.  
When the time for men to apply for DI is extended to 10 years from the time of 
the medical examination all three continuous measures of BMI have the expected 
signs, and become statistically significant at the 10 percent level. A one unit increase 
in measured BMI is associated with a 0.27 percentage point increase in the probability 
                                                 
4 Models were estimated with two different sets of controls for age. In the first specification age and age 
squared were included as regressors. In the second specification indicators for age at time of exam were 
used. The two specifications yield nearly identical results, and so we report only the results for the 
specification including age and age squared in this paper.  
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of applying for DI within 10 years. Obesity based on measured BMI is now 
statistically significant at the 10 percent level, and the two obesity measures based 
self-reported BMI are significant at the 5 percent level. Being obese by measured BMI 
at the time of the medical exam is estimated to increase the probability of applying for 
DI benefits within 10 years by approximately 3.86 percentage points. Obesity based 
on self-reported weight and height is estimated to increase the probability of applying 
for DI benefits within 10 years by 6.75 percentage points. Obesity based on self-
reported weight and height adjusted using the Cawley and Burkhauser (2006) method 
is estimated to increases the probability of applying for DI benefits within 10 years by 
5.26 percentage points. The coefficients on WC and obese PBF (skinfold) now have 
the expected signs, though they remain insignificant. 
Table 3.2. Social Security Disability Insurance Application Probits for Persons 
Ages 21 to 48 
 Men  Women 
 Application for DI within:  Application for DI within: 
Measure of Fatness: 5 years 10 years   5 years 10 years 
Total Body Fat (w/ Fat Free Mass) -0.00128 -0.00028   0.00095 0.00243** 
 (-1.23) (-0.19)  (1.35) (2.61) 
 [0.93694] [0.87747]  [0.94362] [0.88814] 
Fat Free Mass (w/ Total Body Fat) 0.00057 0.00125   -0.00025 -0.00193 
  (0.72) (1.15)   (-0.23) (-0.95) 
  [0.93694] [0.87747]   [0.94362] [0.88814] 
Percent Body Fat (BIA) -0.00173 -0.00136  0.00107 0.00218** 
 (-1.44) (-0.77)  (1.14) (2.27) 
 [0.93978] [0.87940]  [0.94527] [0.88982] 
Percent Body Fat (skinfold) -0.00050 -0.00029   0.00052 0.00104** 
  (-0.70) (-0.36)   (1.40) (2.10) 
  [0.93883] [0.87410]   [0.94610] [0.88647] 
Percent Fat Free Mass 0.00173 0.00136  -0.00107 -0.00218** 
 (1.44) (0.77)  (-1.15) (-2.27) 
 [0.93978] [0.87940]  [0.94527] [0.88982] 
Body Mass Index (measured) 0.00001 0.00266*   0.00152** 0.00301*** 
  (0.0039) (1.71)   (2.12) (3.38) 
  [0.93694] [0.87747]   [0.94486] [0.88689] 
Coefficients are marginal effects. t-statistics in parentheses. Percent of applicants correctly 
predicted in brackets. *p< 0.10, **p< 0.05, and ***p< 0.01. The models also include age at 
exam, age at exam squared, and race. 
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Table 3.2. (Continued) 
 Men  Women 
 Application for DI within:  Application for DI within: 
Measure of Fatness: 5 years 10 years   5 years 10 years 
Body Mass Index (self-reported) 0.00003 0.00309*  0.00141** 0.00302*** 
 (0.016) (1.87)  (2.13) (2.91) 
 [0.93599] [0.87554]  [0.94527] [0.88689] 
Body Mass Index  -0.00005 0.00291*   0.00134** 0.00278*** 
(self-reported, adjusted) (-0.036) (1.91)   (2.07) (2.74) 
  [0.93694] [0.87651]   [0.94527] [0.88605] 
Waist Circumference -0.00020 0.00072  0.00093*** 0.00145*** 
 (-0.31) (1.14)  (3.26) (3.18) 
 [0.93883] [0.87410]  [0.94403] [0.89024] 
Waist-to-Hip Ratio 0.00369 0.15714   0.11584** 0.17119** 
  (0.038) (1.14)   (2.14) (2.03) 
  [0.93694] [0.87699]   [0.94610] [0.88898] 
Obese by PBF (BIA) -0.00132 -0.00060  0.01585 0.02125 
 (-0.11) (-0.044)  (1.34) (1.40) 
 [0.93694] [0.87603]  [0.94652] [0.88563] 
Obese by PBF (skinfold) -0.00989 0.01607   0.01326 0.02405* 
  (-0.92) (0.88)   (1.28) (1.91) 
  [0.93789] [0.87506]  [0.94403] [0.88689] 
Obese by BMI (measured) 0.01761 0.03860*  0.02171* 0.04809*** 
 (0.81) (1.84)  (1.81) (3.13) 
 [0.93646] [0.87795]  [0.94610] [0.89108] 
Obese by BMI (self-reported) 0.03646 0.06745**   0.02777** 0.05993*** 
  (1.36) (2.48)   (2.07) (3.15) 
  [0.93646] [0.88037]   [0.94610] [0.88856] 
Obese by BMI  0.02492 0.05261**  0.01964* 0.04637*** 
(self-reported, adjusted) (1.04) (2.03)  (1.76) (2.84) 
 [0.93741] [0.88037]  [0.94610] [0.88940] 
High Risk WC 0.00716 0.02834   0.03208*** 0.04033*** 
  (0.36) (1.22)   (2.94) (3.17) 
  [0.93599] [0.87699]   [0.94279] [0.88689] 
High Risk WHR 0.00323 0.01806  0.01462 0.00953 
 (0.18) (0.99)  (1.26) (0.63) 
  [0.93646] [0.87554]   [0.94527] [0.89191] 
Number of Applications 69 147   70 161 
Sample Size 2109 2073  2412 2387 
 
As an alternative method of assessing the relative predictive power of the 
various measures of fatness, the percent of persons correctly classified as applicants or 
non-applicants was also calculated. Despite the measures of fatness based on PBF 
from BIA being statistically insignificant, they generally outperform the other 
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measures of fatness in terms of correctly predicting application for DI benefits. In the 
men 5 year case, PBF correctly classified the greatest portion of the sample at 93.98 
percent. In the men 10 year case, obese based on self-reported weight and height 
correctly classified the greatest portion of the sample at 88.0 percent.  
Results from the models for female application for DI benefits within 5 years 
of the medical examination suggest that fatness is more predictive of DI application by 
women. As shown in Table 3.2, all the coefficients have the expected sign. All three 
continuous measures of BMI are significant at the 5 percent level, as is obesity from 
self-reported BMI. Obesity from measured BMI and self-reported adjusted BMI are 
significant at the 10 percent level. A one unit increase in measured BMI is associated 
with a 0.15 percentage point increase in the probability of applying for DI within 5 
years. Being classified as obese by measured BMI is estimated to increase the 
probability of DI application within 5 years by 2.17 percentage points. 
The more medically accurate WC is significant at the 1 percent level, as is and 
being classified as high-risk based on WC. A one unit increase in WC is associated 
with a 0.09 percentage point increase in the probability of applying for DI within 5 
years. Being classified as high-risk based on WC is associated with a 3.21 percentage 
point increase in the probability of DI application within 5 years. WHR is significant 
at the 5 percent level, and a one percentage point increase in WHR increases the 
probability of DI application within 5 years by 0.12 percentage points. 
The association between fatness and DI application by women is even stronger 
in the 10 year sample. All coefficients continue to have the correct sign, and only 
FFM, obese PBF (BIA and skinfold), and high risk WHR are not significant. Of the 17 
measures of fatness, 9 are significant at the 1 percent level. Again focusing on BMI, a 
one unit increase in measured BMI is associated with a 0.30 percentage point increase 
in the probability of applying for DI within 10 years. Being classified as obese by 
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measured BMI is estimated to increase the probability of DI application within 10 
years by 4.81 percentage points. 
For women, the various measures of fatness correctly classify those who apply 
for benefits at approximately the same rate. In the 5 year sample, obese based on BIA 
correctly classifies the greatest portion of the sample at 94.7 percent. However, at 10 
years high risk WHR correctly classifies the greatest portion of the sample at 89.19 
percent. 
We next estimate models of DI application which add controls for education, 
marital status, and income to poverty ratio to the previous controls age at exam and 
race. These results are presented in Table 3.3. With the inclusion of the additional 
controls, all the fatness coefficients for DI application by men within 5 years of their 
medical exam remain insignificant. Moreover, only measured BMI, all three BMI 
based obesity measures, and high-risk WC retain the expected sign.  
For men applying for DI within 10 years of their medical examination, the 
estimates from the models which add controls for education, marital status, and 
income to poverty ratio are not statistically different from the coefficient estimates 
obtain from the model with only age and race. All three continuous measures of BMI 
remain significant at the 10 percent level. Only obese based on self-reported BMI or 
obese based on self-reported adjusted BMI are significant at the 5 percent level.  
Controlling for education, marital status, and income to poverty ratio appears 
to have more of an effect on the estimates for women. In terms of application for DI 
within 5 years, only 3 of the 9 measures of fatness that were originally significant 
remain statistically significant. The remaining three include measured BMI, WC, and 
high-risk WC. The effect of education, marital status, and income to poverty ratio on 
the fatness coefficient estimates dissipates considerably in the 10 year application 
sample, with only WHR and obese (skinfold) reduced to insignificance.  
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Table 3.3. Social Security Disability Insurance Application Probits for Persons 
Ages 21 to 48, with Education and Marital Status 
 Men  Women 
 Application for DI within:  Application for DI within: 
Measure of Fatness: 5 years 10 years   5 years 10 years 
Total Body Fat (w/ Fat Free Mass) -0.00136 -0.00073   0.00064 0.00198** 
 (-1.35) (-0.51)  (0.95) (2.35) 
 [0.93883] [0.87844]  [0.94693] [0.89568] 
Fat Free Mass (w/ Total Body Fat) 0.00082 0.00198*   0.00017 -0.00116 
  (1.01) (1.81)   (0.18) (-0.68) 
  [0.93883] [0.87844]   [0.94693] [0.89568] 
Percent Body Fat (BIA) -0.00172 -0.00130  0.00088 0.00193** 
 (-1.51) (-0.78)  (0.95) (2.02) 
 [0.94026] [0.87892]  [0.94693] [0.89401] 
Percent Body Fat (skinfold) -0.00042 0.00009   0.00041 0.00092* 
  (-0.68) (0.12)   (1.19) (1.86) 
  [0.93883] [0.87603]   [0.94693] [0.89359] 
Percent Fat Free Mass 0.00172 0.00130  -0.00088 -0.00193** 
 (1.51) (0.78)  (-0.95) (-2.02) 
 [0.94026] [0.87892]  [0.94693] [0.89401] 
Body Mass Index (measured) 0.00002 0.00261*   0.00125* 0.00268*** 
  (0.013) (1.95)   (1.69) (2.84) 
  [0.93694] [0.87603]   [0.94610] [0.89275] 
Body Mass Index (self-reported) -0.00017 0.00259*  0.00102 0.00254** 
 (-0.13) (1.74)  (1.49) (2.31) 
 [0.93694] [0.87603]  [0.94776] [0.89527] 
Body Mass Index  -0.00018 0.00257*   0.00100 0.00238** 
 (self-reported, adjusted) (-0.15) (1.88)   (1.49) (2.24) 
  [0.93789] [0.87506]   [0.94776] [0.89485] 
Waist Circumference -0.00020 0.00068  0.00078** 0.00125** 
 (-0.38) (1.20)  (2.50) (2.53) 
 [0.93883] [0.87410]  [0.94486] [0.89443] 
Waist-to-Hip Ratio -0.04693 0.01469   0.08214 0.10516 
  (-0.51) (0.11)   (1.44) (1.05) 
  [0.93883] [0.87603]   [0.94693] [0.89401] 
Obese by PBF (BIA) -0.00150 -0.00159  0.01617 0.02206 
 (-0.13) (-0.11)  (1.35) (1.45) 
 [0.93599] [0.87603]  [0.94693] [0.89317] 
Obese by PBF (skinfold) -0.00996 0.01608   0.01075 0.02076 
  (-0.94) (0.86)   (1.02) (1.58) 
  [0.93789] [0.87506]   [0.94610] [0.89485] 
Coefficients are marginal effects. t-statistics in parentheses. Percent of applicants correctly 
predicted in brackets. *p< 0.10, **p< 0.05, and ***p< 0.01. The models also include 
education, age at exam, age at exam squared, marital status, race, and family income-to-
poverty ratio. 
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Table 3.3. (Continued) 
 Men  Women 
 Application for DI within:  Application for DI within: 
Measure of Fatness: 5 years 10 years   5 years 10 years 
Obese by BMI (measured) 0.01741 0.03607*  0.01494 0.03742** 
 (0.95) (1.93)  (1.34) (2.49) 
 [0.93694] [0.87410]  [0.94693] [0.89527] 
Obese by BMI (self-reported) 0.03340 0.05890**   0.01880 0.04681** 
  (1.45) (2.46)   (1.61) (2.63) 
  [0.93599] [0.87699]   [0.94693] [0.89359] 
Obese by BMI  0.02232 0.04615*  0.01322 0.03655** 
(self-reported, adjusted) (1.07) (1.99)  (1.30) (2.29) 
 [0.93599] [0.87603]  [0.94610] [0.89401] 
High Risk WC 0.00667 0.02514   0.02754** 0.03273** 
  (0.40) (1.22)   (2.39) (2.45) 
  [0.93694] [0.87410]   [0.94569] [0.89401] 
High Risk WHR -0.00219 0.00263  0.00936 -0.00549 
 (-0.13) (0.16)  (0.70) (-0.34) 
  [0.93694] [0.87603]   [0.94610] [0.89778] 
Number of Applications 69 147   70 161 
Sample Size 2109 2073  2412 2387 
 
Lastly, we estimate models which add family income as a regressor. By adding 
income to the model we can estimate the extent to which the effect of fatness on 
disability application operates through income. Table 3.4 presents results from models 
of DI application which include family income in addition to the previous 
demographic characteristics. For both men and women in either the 5 year or 10 year 
sample the addition of income to the model does not significantly affect any of the 
coefficient estimates. For men, BMI and obesity based on BMI continue to stand out 
as strong predictors of future application for DI benefits. A one unit increase in 
measured BMI is associated with a 0.27 percentage point increase in the probability of 
applying for DI within 10 years, while being classified as obese by measured BMI is 
estimated to increase the probability of DI application within 10 years by 3.89 
percentage points. 
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For women, WC and BMI, either continuous or as indicators for excessive 
fatness, remain strong predictors of future application for DI benefits. A one unit 
increase in WC is associated with a 0.12 percentage point increase in the probability of 
applying for DI within 10 years, while being classified as high-risk based on WC is 
associated with a 2.98 percentage point increase in the probability of DI application 
within 10 years. A one unit increase in measured BMI is associated with a 0.26 
percentage point increase in the probability of applying for DI within 10 years, while 
being classified as obese by measured BMI is estimated to increase the probability of 
DI application within 10 years by 3.57 percentage points. 
Table 3.4. Social Security Disability Insurance Application Probits for Persons 
Ages 21 to 48, with Family Income 
 Men  Women 
 Application for DI within:  Application for DI within: 
Measure of Fatness: 5 years 10 years   5 years 10 years 
Total Body Fat (w/ Fat Free Mass) -0.00137 -0.00058   0.00055 0.00185** 
 (-1.38) (-0.42)  (0.83) (2.27) 
 [0.93741] [0.88037]  [0.94237] [0.89233] 
Fat Free Mass (w/ Total Body Fat) 0.00083 0.00190*   0.00021 -0.00108 
  (1.08) (1.79)   (0.22) (-0.63) 
  [0.93741] [0.88037]   [0.94237] [0.89233] 
Percent Body Fat (BIA) -0.00172 -0.00117  0.00074 0.00179* 
 (-1.53) (-0.70)  (0.83) (1.90) 
 [0.93741] [0.88278]  [0.94403] [0.89359] 
Percent Body Fat (skinfold) -0.00039 0.00019   0.00036 0.00086* 
  (-0.62) (0.25)   (1.05) (1.74) 
  [0.93551] [0.87892]   [0.94403] [0.89317] 
Percent Fat Free Mass 0.00172 0.00117  -0.00074 -0.00179* 
 (1.53) (0.70)  (-0.83) (-1.90) 
 [0.93741] [0.88278]  [0.94403] [0.89359] 
Coefficients are marginal effects. t-statistics in parentheses. Percent of applicants correctly 
predicted in brackets. *p< 0.10, **p< 0.05, and ***p< 0.01. The models also include 
education, age at exam, age at exam squared, marital status, race, family income-to-
poverty ratio, and family income category. 
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Table 3.4. (Continued) 
 Men  Women 
 Application for DI within:  Application for DI within: 
Measure of Fatness: 5 years 10 years   5 years 10 years 
Body Mass Index (measured) 0.00001 0.00271*   0.00115 0.00257** 
  (0.0056) (1.98)   (1.53) (2.66) 
  [0.93694] [0.87892]   [0.94237] [0.89233] 
Body Mass Index (self-reported) -0.00021 0.00268*  0.00083 0.00240** 
 (-0.17) (1.78)  (1.18) (2.11) 
 [0.93694] [0.87988]  [0.94237] [0.89401] 
      
Body Mass Index  -0.00022 0.00267*   0.00080 0.00223** 
 (self-reported, adjusted) (-0.18) (1.93)   (1.18) (2.03) 
  [0.93694] [0.87988]   [0.94237] [0.89317] 
Waist Circumference -0.00018 0.00075  0.00074** 0.00119** 
 (-0.35) (1.31)  (2.37) (2.37) 
 [0.93504] [0.87892]  [0.94444] [0.89108] 
Waist-to-Hip Ratio -0.04551 0.02871   0.07176 0.09795 
  (-0.50) (0.22)   (1.40) (1.02) 
  [0.93504] [0.87892]   [0.94403] [0.89778] 
Obese by PBF (BIA) -0.00078 0.00052  0.01478 0.02102 
 (-0.068) (0.035)  (1.22) (1.42) 
 [0.93694] [0.87892]  [0.94486] [0.89359] 
Obese by PBF (skinfold) -0.00967 0.01591   0.00907 0.01940 
  (-0.90) (0.85)   (0.88) (1.52) 
  [0.93694] [0.87988]   [0.94403] [0.89527] 
Obese by BMI (measured) 0.01786 0.03886*  0.01487 0.03567** 
 (1.01) (2.00)  (1.29) (2.33) 
 [0.93504] [0.87603]  [0.94154] [0.89401] 
Obese by BMI (self-reported) 0.03184 0.05968**   0.01675 0.04446** 
  (1.45) (2.49)   (1.39) (2.47) 
  [0.93409] [0.87603]   [0.94237] [0.89401] 
Obese by BMI  0.02064 0.04613*  0.01229 0.03508** 
(self-reported, adjusted) (1.04) (1.99)  (1.12) (2.16) 
 [0.93504] [0.87506]  [0.94320] [0.89317] 
High Risk WC 0.00741 0.02629   0.02583** 0.02984** 
  (0.45) (1.23)   (2.21) (2.28) 
  [0.93504] [0.87699]   [0.94362] [0.89485] 
High Risk WHR -0.00215 0.00458  0.01177 -0.00388 
 (-0.14) (0.26)  (0.94) (-0.23) 
  [0.93599] [0.87795]   [0.94486] [0.89736] 
Number of Applications 69 147   70 161 
Sample Size 2109 2073  2412 2387 
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3.9. Discussion 
The existing research into the impact of fatness on disability has consistently found 
that obesity, measured using BMI, increases the probability that a respondent reports 
themselves as disabled or receiving DI benefits (Ferraro et al., 2002; Burkhauser and 
Cawley, 2005). This paper builds on the previous literature by demonstrating that BMI 
based obesity is a significant predictor of future application for DI benefits for both 
men and women: the underlying policy outcome of interest in this literature. 
Moreover, it suggests that the use of alternative measures of fatness, mainly percent 
body fat from BIA and waist circumference, may more accurately predict future DI 
application, particularly for women. 
Previous literature has suggested that BMI is a poor measure of true fatness 
(Burkhauser and Cawley, 2008), and is less able to predict negative health outcomes 
than more accurate measures of fatness (Kragelund, 2005; Yusuf et al., 2005). Despite 
these limitations, the results presented in this paper suggest that BMI is consistently a 
significant predictor of at least one outcome of policy interest: future application for 
DI by both men and women. However, sensitivity tests examining alternative 
outcomes such as current employment and future mortality, suggest that BMI 
performs less well at predicting these outcomes than alternative measures of fatness.5  
As suggested in Burkhauser and Cawley (2008), it appears that the measure of 
fatness that is most predictive of outcomes of interest to social scientists depends on 
the specific outcome examined. The results presented in this paper further suggest that 
the relative predictive power of various measures of fatness varies between men and 
women, even when the same outcome is examined. Therefore, research into the impact 
of fatness on various outcomes would benefit from wider availability of alternative 
measures of fatness in the data sets most commonly used by social scientists. Waist 
                                                 
5 Results from these sensitivity tests are not included in this paper, but are available from the authors 
upon request. 
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circumference appears to be a particularly good alternative to BMI as a measure of 
fatness. However, as BMI is generally predictive of all outcomes of interest, the 
findings of this paper, and other research, should in no way discourage the use of BMI 
and BMI based obesity in future research. Rather, it should encourage researchers to 
add alternative measures of fatness to their analysis whenever possible.  
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